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THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
DETERMINATIONS IN SUBSEQUENT 
LITIGATION: A FEDERAL SOLUTION 
ANN C. HODOESt 
INTRODUCTION 
The increase in employment termination litigation 1 has led to 
increased efforts to use unemployment compensation determina-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A. 1973, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; M.A. 1974, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign; J.D. 1981, Northwestern University. Research for this 
article was funded by grants from the University of Richmond Faculty Research 
Committee and the Hunton & Williams Summer Research Fund. This article 
benefitted from comments on earlier drafts and from discussions of the issues 
with Ronald L. Adler, President of Laurdan Associates, Inc.; Paul E. Freehling, 
partner at Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, Ltd.; Richard W. McHugh, Associate 
General Counsel, UAW; and my colleague, Professor W. Clark Williams. I also 
acknowledge the valuable research assistance of John M. Craig, J.D. 1991, 
Judiann Chartier, J.D. 1992, and Bich Quyen Nguyen, Class of 1993, University 
of Richmond Law School. 
1. Judicial acceptance of the theory of wrongful discharge has proceeded 
rapidly since 1980. J. DERTouzos, E. HOLLAND & P. EBENER, THE LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 13 (1988). A study of court 
documents filed in Los Angeles since 1980 revealed a rapid rise in the number 
of wrongful discharge cases filed. Id. at 15. The number of wrongful discharge 
cases doubled between 1982 and 1987. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WITHOUT 
JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER'S PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO WRONGFUL DIS-
CHARGE (1989). The Bureau of National Affairs estimated that there were ap-
proximately 25,000 discharge cases pending at the time of its study. Id. The 
potential number of cases is far greater. An estimated 150,000 unjust discharges 
occur each year. M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 
839 (2d ed. 1991). 
Employment discrimination litigation also has grown exponentially in the 
past twenty years, increasing several times faster than the remainder of the civil 
caseload in the federal courts. Siegelman & Donohue, Studying the Iceberg from 
its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 1133, 1163 (1990); Donohue & Siegelman, The 
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 
983, 985 (1991). A primary factor fueling the growth of employment discrimi-
nation litigation has been the increase in unemployment. Id. at 990-91. Most of 
the growth in employment discrimination litigation has been in suits alleging 
discriminatory discharge. Siegelman & Donohue, supra, at 1164. Approximately 
59% of employment discrimination suits allege unlawful discharge. Donohue & 
Siegelman, supra, at 1015. 
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tions to preclude subsequent litigation. 2 The number of cases 
holding that a decision in an unemployment compensation pro-
ceeding collaterally estops relitigation of the issue in a later lawsuit 
regarding the employee's discharge is not large. Nevertheless, courts 
in many states have recognized that preclusion will apply under 
appropriate circumstances. 3 Unemployment statutes typically pro-
2. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are the two doctrines of preclusion. 
See infra notes 9-23 and accompanying text; Committee on Benefits to Unem-
ployed Persons, The Preclusive Effect of Unemployment Decisions in Subsequent 
Litigation, 4 LAB. LAW. 69, 69 n.1 (1988). Res judicata prevents relitigation of 
claims on the same cause of action, while collateral estoppel prevents relitigation 
of identical issues in any cause of action. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. 
MILLER, Civn. PROCEDURE 613 (1985). The preclusion doctrine most often relevant 
in the context of unemployment compensation decisions is collateral estoppel, 
since the later litigation is rarely on the same claim. See Committee On Benefits 
to Unemployed Persons, supra, at 69 n.3. Accordingly, this article uses the terms 
preclusion and collateral estoppel interchangeably to refer to the application of 
collateral estoppel. 
There also have been efforts to bar unemployment compensation litigation 
based on discharge litigation. See, e.g., Pennsylvania State Police v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 135 Pa. Commw. Ct. 71, 578 A.2d 1360 (1990); 
City of Columbia v. ESC, Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) , 8345 (S.C. Ct. Common 
Pleas 1981) (June 25, 1981); Pickaway Co. Gen'l. Health Dist. v. Administrator, 
Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) , 9582 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1985). Application 
of collateral estoppel in this context is beyond the scope of this article. 
3. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text. As of 
1989, fourteen states had enacted legislation barring use of unemployment com-
pensation determinations in subsequent litigation. Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. 28 (1989) (testimony of Congressman Bruce A. Morrison); see, e.g., 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-406 (1990 Cum. Supp.); Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-74-108 
(1986 Repl. Vol.). Ohio created a statutory prohibition on collateral estoppel in 
1989. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(5) (Baldwin Supp. 1991). In 1990, four 
additional states amended their unemployment statutes to prohibit estoppel based 
on compensation determinations. See Runner, Changes in Unemployment Insur-
ance Legislation During 1990, 114 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 63, 63, 65, 66 (1991). 
While Runner cites six states as amending their statutes to preclude the use, in 
other proceedings, of information obtained in unemployment proceedings, id. at 
63, the amended statutes of Minnesota and Kentucky do not appear to expressly 
bar preclusion based on unemployment proceedings. See id. at 65; KY. REv. 
STAT. § 341.190 (Baldwin Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.12,12 (West 
Supp. 1992). In 1991, Georgia, Iowa, North Dakota, and Texas amended their 
unemployment compensation statutes to prohibit application of collateral estoppel 
based on unemployment compensation decisions. See Runner, Changes in Un-
employmellt Insurance Legislation in 1991, 115 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 64, 66, 68 
(1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-122(b) (Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.6.4 
(West Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-37.1 (Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. Crv. 
STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-9(r) (Supp. 1992). See also Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 
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vide that employees who are discharged for misconduct or who 
quit without good cause are disqualified from receiving benefits.4 
These issues may be relevant in later action alleging either that the 
discharge was unlawful5 or that the employee was constructively 
discharged unlawfully. 6 The potential overlap of issues raises the 
question of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply 
to preclude relitigation in the second forum. Both employers and 
employees have asserted issue preclusion arguments based on un-
employment compensation decisions, and employers and employees 
as a group have both benefitted and suffered from the application 
of collateral estoppel. 7 
This article examines the use of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel to preclude litigation of statutory and common law actions 
challenging employee discharge based on determinations in un-
employment compensation proceedings. First, the article reviews 
the history of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and examines the 
policies underlying its application. Next, the article reviews un-
Mich. 368, 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988) (according preclusive effect to unemployment 
compensation determinations incompatible with legislative policy underlying un-
employment compensation statutes). 
4. See Unemployment Insurance, 52 Soc. SECURITY BuLL. No. 7, at 21 
(July 1989); Saucier & Roberts, Unemployment Compensation, A Growing Con-
cern for Employers, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 594, 599 (1984). 
5. Both statutory and common law actions challenging discharges involve 
inquiry into the reasons for dismissal. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying 
text. 
6. Constructive discharge is the employer's creation of a working situation 
that is so intolerable that the employee quits to avoid working under those 
conditions. Mazurak, Effects of Unemployment Compensation Proceedings on 
Related Labor Litigation, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 133, 146 (1980). The concept of 
constructive discharge has been recognized in various types of employment 
discrimination actions as well as wrongful discharge cases. See, e.g., Buckley v. 
Hospital Corp. of Am., 758 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985) (constructive discharge 
under ADEA); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(constructive discharge under Title VII); NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636 
F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1980) (constructive discharge under National Labor Relations 
Act); J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972) (constructive 
discharge under NLRA); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(constructive discharge under Title VII); Robson v. Eva's Super Market, Inc., 
538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (constructive discharge under Title VII); Beye 
v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 477 A.2d 1197, cert. denied, 301 
Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984) (constructive discharge actionable element in 
retaliatory discharge claim); Bratcher v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 308 Ore. 501, 783 P.2d 
4 (1989) (constructive discharge is actionable element in retaliatory discharge 
claim); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 39-2-903(1) (1987) (constructive discharge actionable). 
7. See cases cited infra notes 108-201 and accompanying text. 
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employment compensation law and analyzes the cases that have 
considered whether unemployment compensation determinations 
have preclusive effect in later litigation. After examining the ex-
isting law, the article engages in a comparative analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages of according preclusive effect to 
unemployment compensation determinations, in light of the policies 
underlying both collateral estoppel and unemployment compensa-
tion. This article concludes that application of the collateral es-
toppel doctrine serves few of the beneficial purposes that underlie 
the doctrine and has an adverse impact on the policies that 
motivated enactment and design of unemployment compensation 
laws. The article urges passage of federal legislation that would 
require states to deny preclusive effect to unemployment compen-
sation decisions. 8 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue pre-
clusion, 9 precludes relitigation of an issue that has been conclusively 
resolved by one tribunal in a second forum that is considering a 
different but related dispute. 10 While the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is currently viewed as an application of the doctrine of 
res judicata, 11 the two doctrines had very different origins. 12 Res 
judicata evolved from Roman law and provides that a prior 
judgment is conclusive in a second action that involves the same 
8. See infra notes 322-38 and accompanying text for discussion of proposed 
legislation that is currently pending in Congress. 
9. See Vestal, Res Judicata!Preclusion By Judgment: The Law Applied in 
Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1723 (1968). 
10. Comment, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency Deter-
minations: Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 
817, 819-20 (1988). Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of any issue that was 
contested and decided in the first action even where the second action is based 
on a different claim than the first. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, 
supra note 2, at 607. 
11. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive 
Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. 
REv. 422, 426 n.19 (1983); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative 
Agency Actions In Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 65, 67 
(1977). See Vestal, supra note 9, at 1723. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
uses the term res judicata generically to apply to both res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 608. Both 
doctrines, res judicata and collateral estoppel, are doctrines of preclusion by 
judgment. Id. at 607. 
12. Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 426. 
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parties and the same claim. 13 Application of res judicata serves, 
and is motivated by, the goal of finality in litigation.14 Res judicata 
also serves the goals of judicial economy, fairness to litigants, and 
preservation of the prestige of the courts by preventing inconsistent 
judgments on the same claim. 15 
Collateral estoppel, 16 of Germanic origin, was based on the 
principle that the parties' actions in the earlier adjudication created 
an estoppel in the later litigation.17 Initially, application of collat-
eral estoppel did not require a final judgment in the earlier action 
because the estoppel was based on the conduct of the party in the 
prior litigation.18 However, the doctrine has evolved to require a 
final judgment as a condition for application. 19 Despite the differ-
ence in origin, collateral estoppel serves the same goals as res 
judicata-finality, fairness, judicial economy, and judicial pres-
tige. 20 The doctrine preserves finality of judgments and conserves 
judicial resources by preventing relitigation of an issue that was 
13. Id.; J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. Mn.LER, supra note 2, at 607. 
14. Res judicata applies to matters that were or could have been litigated 
in the earlier action. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. Mn.LER, supra note 2, at 
613. 
15. Vestal, supra note 9, at 1723. Finality of judgments is not an end in 
itself, but rather has value because it furthers other goals, such as fairness to 
litigants, judicial economy, and preservation of the prestige of the courts. See 
University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986). 
16. Collateral estoppel is one form of estoppel by judgment which applies 
when the first and second claims are different. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. 
Mn.LER, supra note 2, at 608. The other category of estoppel by judgment is 
direct estoppel, which applies when the first claim and the second claim are on 
the same cause of action. Id. Since res judicata typically precludes the second 
suit on the same claim, applications of direct estoppel are rare. Id. 
17. Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 426. Estoppel evolved in English law 
to become "an incontestable presumption of the truth of the records made by 
the King's Court." J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. Mn.LER, supra note 2, at 
612. 
18. Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 427. 
19. Id. The finality required for application of collateral estoppel is not 
the same as for res judicata. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. Mn.LER, supra note 
2, at 659. For example, interlocutory orders and preliminary injunctions may 
have collateral estoppel effect, but are not final for purposes of application of 
res judicata. Id. 
20. See Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 439. As noted, finality is important 
because it serves the goals of fairness, economy and prestige. See supra note 15; 
University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986). Courts addressing the 
application of collateral estoppel have identified these same purposes for the 
doctrine. See id. at 798; Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 
(1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979). 
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decided in prior litigation, even if the earlier litigation involved a 
different cause of action. 21 In the second action, additional liti-
gation is permitted only on those issues being raised for the first 
time. 22 The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applied in a number 
of contexts, and may serve each of its goals at different levels in 
different circumstances. 23 
Collateral estoppel is increasingly applied to give preclusive 
effect to findings by administrative bodies.24 In United States v. 
Utah Construction & Mining Co.,25 the United States Supreme 
Court held that a decision by the Advisory Board of Contract 
Appeals, an administrative agency, should be given preclusive effect 
by the court of claims in a contractual dispute between a contrac-
tor, Utah Construction and Mining, and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. While the decision was based upon the agreement of the 
parties and statutory construction of the Wunderlich Act, 26 the 
Court noted that its holding was in accord with general principles 
of collateral estoppel, and went on to approve the application of 
res judicata principles to administrative proceedings, stating: 
21. J. FRtEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 658. 
22. Id. 
23. Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 439. Perschbacher discusses the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel primarily in the context of administrative proceedings 
and suggests that courts must balance the interests served by the application of 
collateral estoppel, focusing on the degree to which such purposes are accom-
plished in the particular case, with the adverse effects of such application, to 
avoid "results 'abhorrent to [our] sense of justice and to orderly law adminis-
tration.'" Id. 
24. See K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989 SUPPLE-
MENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 399 (1989); Note, supra note 11, at 66; 
Freehling, Judicial Application of the Collateral Estoppel Doctrine to Adminis-
trative Agency Decisions (unpublished manuscript on file at The Wayne Law 
Review). Professor Vestal suggests that courts are expanding the use of the 
doctrines of preclusion in order to deal with the significant increase in the 
workload of the courts. Vestal, supra note 9, at 1723-24. The courts have not 
only expanded the preclusion doctrines to apply to administrative decisionmaking, 
but also have expanded the use of the doctrines in other ways, such as abandoning 
the requirement of mutuality. Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 424; Vestal, supra 
note 9, at 1724. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offensive 
use of collateral estoppel approved); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (defensive use of collateral estoppel 
approved). 
25. 384 U.S. 394 (1966). 
26. 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1988). The Act permits "judicial review of 
decisions made by federal departments and agencies under standard 'disputes' 
clause in government contracts (footnote omitted)." United States v. Carlo 
Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 710 (1963). 
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When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial ca-
pacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before 
it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to 
litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata 
to enforce repose. . . . In the present case the Board was 
acting in a judicial capacity when it considered the Pier 
Drilling and Shield Window claims, the factual disputes 
resolved were clearly relevant to issues properly before it, 
and both parties had a full and fair opportunity to argue 
their version of the facts and an opportunity to seek court 
review of any adverse findings. There is, therefore, neither 
need nor justification for a second evidentiary hearing on 
these matters already resolved as between these two par-
ties. 27 
The Utah Construction court noted that its decision avoided un-
necessary time and expense for the courts and the parties and 
encouraged the parties to litigate fully at the administrative level. 28 
In three subsequent decisions dealing with employment discrim-
ination claims, the Supreme Court addressed the use of collateral 
estoppel in the administrative context.29 In Kremer v. Chemical 
Construction Corp., 30 the Court held that a state administrative 
decision, made without a hearing and affirmed by the state ap-
pellate court, precludes litigation of a Title VIl31 claim in federal 
court. The Court's decision was based on the statutory requirement32 
that the federal courts afford the same full faith and credit to 
state court judgments that would apply in the state's courts.33 
Four years later, the Court held, based on its interpretation of 
the congressional intent underlying Title VII, that an unappealed 
state administrative finding does not bar litigation of a subsequent 
Title VII claim in federal court.34 With respect to the plaintiff's 
27. 384 U.S. at 422 (citations omitted). 
28. Id. at 419-20. 
29. See Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Administrative Decision-
making and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367 (1990) (well-reasoned 
criticism of the Supreme Court's current approach to use of administrative 
preclusion in employment discrimination cases). 
30. 456 U.S. 461, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133 (1982). 
31. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in 
employment based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. See 42 
u.s.c. § 2000e (1988). 
32. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1988). 
33. 456 U.S. at 462-63. 
34. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). 
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claim of race discrimination under the Reconstruction Civil Rights 
Acts,35 however, the Court held that the federal court must give 
the unappealed state administrative finding the same preclusive 
effect that it would receive in the state court. 36 In order for 
preclusive effect to attach, the state administrative agency must 
have acted in a judicial capacity to resolve "disputed issues of 
fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate 
opportunity to litigate . . . . "37 
In its most recent decision on collateral estoppel, the Court 
unanimously declined to give preclusive effect to an unreviewed 
state administrative decision in a subsequent federal action based 
on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).38 While 
the Court recognized a presumption in favor of administrative 
estoppel, 39 it held that estoppel did not apply to bar relitigation 
35. Plaintiff's claim under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts was based 
on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 (1988). Id. at 790-91, 791 n.l. 
36. 478 U.S. at 799 (quoting Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 
422). The court relied in part on its earlier decision in Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90 (1980), which held that § 1738 required state court judgments to be 
given preclusive effect in actions under § 1983, although the Court acknowledged 
that the decision was not controlling since § 1738 did not apply to administrative 
decisions. Id. at 794-95, 796-97. Critics of Elliott have pointed out the problems 
created in cases that join Title VII claims and claims under the Reconstruction 
Civil Rights Acts; preclusion will apply to one claim but not the other, although 
the claims may be based on the same operative facts. See, e.g., Silver, supra 
note 29, at 391-94. In Lytle v. Hqusehold Mfg. Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990), the 
Supreme Court reviewed a decision in which the Fourth Circuit found that the 
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 1981 claim was "apparently erroneous" 
but nonetheless held that the district court's Title VII findings collaterally estopped 
plaintiff from litigating his claim under § 1981. The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that in the absence of the erroneous dismissal of the § 1981 claim, 
plaintiff would have been entitled to a jury trial on the issues common to both 
claims. Id. at 551-52. Accordingly, the § 1981 case must be retried, and collateral 
estoppel could not apply to the court's determination because it would deprive 
the plaintiff of his right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment. Id. at 552-
54. 
37. 478 U.S. at 799 (quoting Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 
422). 
38. Astoria Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2171 
(1991). 
39. The Court noted that: 
[collateral estoppel] is justified on the sound and obvious principle of 
judicial policy that a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat 
fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in 
substance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise. To hold otherwise 
would, as a general matter, impose unjustifiably upon those who have 
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of claims under the ADEA because of the congressional intent 
expressed in the statute. 40 The Court limited only the preclusive 
effect of administrative decisions not judicially reviewed, how-
ever. 41 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Utah Construction, 
courts have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude 
judicial litigation of issues previously determined by administrative 
agencies.42 In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel in this context, the courts have considered the traditional 
elements of collateral estoppel43 as well as the factors cited by the 
Court in Utah Construction.44 Collateral estoppel only applies 
where there is an identity of issues45 and the original tribunal's 
determination is final. 46 The issue on which preclusion is urged 
must have been litigated in the initial action47 and essential to the 
judgment. 48 In addition, the original tribunal must have had both 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 49 
already shouldered their burdens and drain the resources of an adjudi-
catory system with disputes resisting resolution. 
Id. at 2169. 
40. See id. at 2171. 
41. Id. While the opportunity for judicial review is sufficient to meet the 
general requirements for application of collateral estoppel, the Court here found 
that the language of the ADEA indicated that Congress intended to deny 
preclusive effect to unreviewed state administrative findings in judicial actions 
under the ADEA. Id. The Court expressly noted that § 1738, which had moved 
the Court to grant preclusive effect to state court judgments in the context of 
Title VII and § 1983, did not apply. Id. at 2170. See supra notes 30-33, 35-37 
and accompanying text. 
42. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982) expressly rec-
ognizes that with limited exceptions, "a valid and final adjudicative determination 
by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, 
subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court." 
43. The traditional requisites for the application of collateral estoppel are 
designed to insure that a party will not be precluded in the absence of a full and 
fair hearing on the issue in a competent forum. See Comment, supra note 10, 
at 823. 
44. Id. at 827-28. 
45. J. FRmDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 662; Comment, 
supra note 10, at 823. Originally there was a requirement of identity of parties 
as well, but that requirement has been virtually abandoned. Perschbacher, supra 
note 11, at 424 and n.14. 
46. Comment, supra note 10, at 824; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 13 (1982). 
47. This requirement is met if the parties to the initial action disputed the 
issue and the decisionmaker resolved it. Note, supra note 11, at 68. 
48. /d. at 68-69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
49. Note, supra note 11, at 67; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 83, 
comment d (1982). 
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In addition to these traditional requirements of collateral es-
toppel, the Utah Construction factors require that in order for an 
administrative agency decision to preclude later litigation of an 
identical issue, the agency must have acted in a judicial capacity 
to resolve disputed issues of fact properly before it which the 
parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate in the proceeding. 50 
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments sets forth the elements 
necessary for an agency to be acting in a judicial capacity. 51 The 
administrative proceeding must have contained the essential ele-
ments of adjudication which include: 
(a) [a]dequate notice to persons ... bound by the 
adjudication . . . ; 
(b) [t]he right ... to present evidence and argument 
. . . and [a] fair opportunity to rebut evidence and argu-
ment by opposing parties; 
(c) [a] formulation of issues of law and fact in terms 
of the application of rules with respect to specified parties 
concerning a specific transaction, situation, or status, or a 
specific series thereof; 
(d) a rule of finality ... ; and 
(e) [s]uch other procedural elements as may be necessary 
to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclu-
sively determining the matter in question, having regard 
for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, 
the urgency with which the matter must be resolved and 
the opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence and for-
mulate legal contentions. 52 
The Restatement also notes several exceptions to application 
of the doctrine based on administrative decisions. Preclusion will 
not operate if the statutory scheme of remedies permits a second 
claim.53 Additionally, preclusion will not apply if the legislative 
policy indicates that the decision of the initial tribunal should not 
be given preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings or that the 
50. 384 U.S. at 422. There is some overlap between the traditional factors 
and those cited in Utah Construction. 
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982). In the section on 
the preclusive effect of administrative decisions, the Restatement has adopted the 
criteria set forth in Utah Construction. Silver, supra note 29, at 411. 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982). 
53. Id. § 83(3). 
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second tribunal should be free to make an independent decision. s4 
These criteria have been used by courts to decide whether unem-
ployment compensation determinations collaterally estop later em-
ployment-related litigation. 
II. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
A. The Unemployment Compensation System 
In order to analyze the application of collateral estoppel based 
on unemployment compensation decisions, an understanding of 
the administrative procedure for unemployment compensation claims 
is essential. The unemployment compensation system was estab-
lished by the Social Security Act of 1935, which created a federal-
state cooperative system for providing benefits.ss The Act created 
incentives for the states to establish unemployment compensation 
systems,s6 and by 1937 each state had passed a federally approved 
law .57 Using the federal requirements and a draft bill created by 
the Social Security Board as a basis for legislation, states enacted 
similar but not identical laws.ss The following description sum-
marizes the basic elements of the claims procedure, which vary 
somewhat from state to state. s9 
Initially, the employee files a claim for benefits with the state 
agency having responsibility for unemployment compensation 
claims.60 The claim is investigated by a local deputy who gathers 
relevant evidence for benefit eligibility from the employer and the 
employee.61 The deputy or the agency's central office then makes 
an initial determination of eligibility for benefits. 62 All states have 
54. Id. § 83(4). 
55. See Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance 
in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REv. 181, 188-89 (1955). 
56. See infra note 283 and accompanying text (discussion of incentives). 
57. Rosbrow, The Unemployment Insurance System Marks Its 50th Anni-
versary, 108 MoNTm.Y LAB. REv. 21, 23 (September 1985). 
58. See R. HUTCHENS, D. LIPSKY & R. STERN, STRIKERS AND SUBSIDIES 18 
(1989). 
59. The description is taken primarily from CCH Unemployment Insurance 
Reports, but is consistent with various other sources that reveal the claims 
procedures in particular states. See also Wall, A Survey of Unemployment Security 
Law: Determining Unemployment Compensation Benefits, 42 LAB. L.J. 179 
(1991). The state laws contain only general provisions regarding claims, and 
agency regulations further define the claims procedure. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. 
(CCH) 1 2020 (1986). 
60. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 2020 (1986). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
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a procedure for employee and employer appeals from this decision, 
which provides an opportunity for a hearing before an impartial 
tribunal, frequently a referee or hearing examiner. 63 If benefits 
have been awarded in an initial unemployment compensation de-
termination, the employee will continue to receive benefits pending 
resolution of any appeal by the employer. 64 
The hearing procedure has been simplified to allow the em-
ployee to participate without counsel. 65 Although the rules of 
evidence and procedure generally do not apply, the hearing officer 
takes documentary and testimonial evidence and makes a decision 
based on the record, which, in most states, is final absent appeal. 66 
Approximately half of the states have an administrative body to 
hear appeals from the hearing officer's decision.67 The second-level 
appeals are made on the record established at the hearing, but the 
appellate tribunal typically has the power to decide questions of 
fact and law and to admit additional evidence.68 Judicial review is 
permitted in all states after administrative remedies are exhausted. 69 
In most states, such review is limited according to general principles 
of administrative law. 70 
The administrative agency deciding unemployment compensa-
tion claims determines whether eligibility requirements, which in-
clude both monetary and nonmonetary standards, are satisfied. 71 
Monetary eligibility requirements mandate that the employee worked 
in covered employment for a specified period of time and earned 
sufficient wages during the appropriate base period specified by 
the statute. 72 Nonmonetary eligibility standards relate to the reasons 
for separation from prior employment and the claimant's contin-
uing availability for employment.73 All states disqualify employees 
who are discharged for misconduct connected with work or who 
63. Id.; Wall, supra note 59, at 179-80. 
64. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) q 2020 (1986) (citing California Dep't of 
Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971)). 
65. Id. 
66. Id.; Wall, supra note 59, at 179-81. 
67. 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) Clj' 2020 (1986). 
68. Id.; Wall, supra note 59, at 181. 
69. 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) q 2020 (1986). 
70. Id. 
71. See W. CORSON, A. HERSHEY, & S. KERACHSKY, NONMONETARY Eum-
BU.ITY IN STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 
(1986). 
72. See id. at 1; 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ~ 2020 (1986). 
73. w. CORSON, A. HERSHEY & s. KERACHSKY, supra note 71, at 1. 
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leave work voluntarily without good cause, 74 but state interpreta-
tions of good cause75 and misconduct vary.76 These disqualifications 
are relevant to the issue of collateral estoppel. 77 
B. Judicial Application of the Collateral Estoppel Doctrine 
The effect of collateral estoppel in unemployment compensa-
tion determinations has become increasingly important because of 
the explosion of wrongful termination litigation in the 1980s.78 
Employees have successfully sued employers on causes of action 
based on wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,79 breach 
of implied contract, 80 and breach of the covenant of good faith 
74. Rosbrow, supra note 57, at 28; Wall, supra note 59, at 179. 
75. See W. CORSON, A. HERSHEY & S. KERACHSKY, supra note 71, at 63-
64 (states vary in whether personal reasons may constitute good cause and if so, 
what personal reasons constitute good cause}; Wall, supra note 59, at 181-82. 
76. See w. CORSON, A. HERSHEY & s. KERACHSKY, supra note 71, at 64-
66. Layoffs for lack of work and terminations for poor performance generally 
are not considered misconduct. Misconduct usually requires that the employee 
deliberately or negligently disregarded the employer's interest with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the policies being violated. To sustain, the disqualifi-
cation in most cases, the employer must show reasonable and consistent appli-
cation of the rules, employee warning, and an attempt to resolve the problem 
with the employee before termination. States vary in whether they require 
deliberate misconduct or whether indifference or negligence is sufficient for 
disqualification. Id.; Wall, supra note 59, at 182-83. 
77. See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra note 1. 
79. Forty states, four qualifiedly, have recognized a cause of action based 
on wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA} § 
505:51-52 (Feb. 1992). The basis for this cause of action is that the employer 
has discharged the employee for a reason that violates the public policy of the 
state. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (employer violated public policy by firing 
employee who refused to participate in unlawful price fixing scheme}; Petermann 
v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employer 
violated public policy by terminating the employee for refusing to perjure himself}; 
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985) (employer 
violated public policy when it discharged employee stockholders for refusing to 
vote their stock in favor of merger that employer favored, but employee stock-
holders opposed). 
80. Thirty-four states, four qualifiedly, have recognized a cause of action 
for breach of contract based on termination of an employee in a manner or for 
a reason that violates oral or written representations of the employer. See 9A 
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) § 505:51-52 (Feb. 1992). See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (contract implied 
on basis of representations by employer}; Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 
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and fair dealing. 81 Employers seeking def ens es to avoid liability in 
an area where their exposure is expanding due to the erosion of 
the ·employment at will doctrine82 have invoked the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, relying most commonly on unemployment com-
pensation determinations that the employee was discharged for 
misconduct. 83 Employees also have invoked the doctrine in an 
attempt to bind the employer to an unemployment compensation 
determination that the employee was not discharged for misconduct 
99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modified, IOI N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) 
(implied promise in employment manual that employees would be terminated 
only for just cause enforceable against employer); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 
57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (contract implied on 
basis of employer assurance of continued employment). 
81. Twelve states have recognized a cause of action by employees alleging 
that their termination violates a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit 
in the employment relationship. See 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) § 505:51-52 (Feb. 
1992). See, e.g., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983) (contracts 
for employment at will in Alaska contain implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (court recognized implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in employment contract, but held that it provided contract rather than 
tort remedies); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 
1251 (1977) (employment contract that allows termination at will contains implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and discharge made in bad faith breaches 
agreement). 
82. See P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 48-71 (1990) (discussion 
of the changing legal image of employment as "at will" and reasons for that 
change); M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, supra note I, at 943 ("Virtually 
all of the states have permitted employees to sue for wrongful discharge, although 
there is no uniformity in the legal basis on which such suits are allowed."). 
83. See, e.g., Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417, 
1420-21 (1984), aff'd without opinion, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (Secretary of 
Labor collaterally estopped in OSHA action alleging employee discharged for 
complaining about statutory violations by determination in unemployment com-
pensation proceeding that employee discharged for walking off job); Pullar v. 
Upjohn Health Care Serv., Inc., 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486, 489 
(1984) (unemployment compensation board's finding that employee discharged 
for just cause in connection with work collaterally estopped employee from 
raising issue of cause for her discharge in age discrimination and wrongful 
discharge action). Note that the Pullar decision was superseded by statute. See 
Noyes v. Channel Prods., Inc., 935 F.2d 806, 809 n.l, reh'g denied en bane, 
U.S. App. LEXIS 18744 (6th Cir. 1991). Employers also have argued that 
unemployment compensation determinations that employees voluntarily quit bar 
later litigation over their discharge. See, e.g., Turk v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., No. 
56749 (Ohio App. Mar. 22, 1990) (1990 Westlaw 32596), appeal denied, 53 Ohio 
St. 3d 704, 528 N.E.2d 59 (1990) (unemployment compensation board determi-
nation that plaintiff voluntarily quit barred plaintiff's claim that he was discharged 
in violation of contract). 
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and remove an employer defense in the wrongful termination case. 84 
The increasing number of collateral estoppel arguments is a 
result of both the expansion of causes of action for wrongful 
discharge and the potential for issue identity between wrongful 
discharge cases and unemployment compensation determinations. 
In actions based on breach of implied contract, the employee 
typically is seeking to hold the employer to a written or oral 
promise to terminate only for just cause. 85 In actions for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the employee is 
seeking to prove that the discharge was in bad faith. 86 In each 
case, one of the employer's defenses will be that the employee was 
terminated for a justifiable reason. 87 In the breach of contract 
action, proof of good cause for discharge will def eat the argument 
that the contract was breached.88 And in breach of covenant cases, 
84. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (employee successfully argued that award of unemployment 
benefits collaterally estopped transit authority from relitigating issue of employee 
drug use in disciplinary proceedings); Salida School Dist. v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 
1160 (Colo. 1987) (teacher unsuccessfully sought to estop employer from denying 
retaliatory discharge claim based on referee's finding that she was discharged for 
her "outspokenness."); McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, 517 N.E.2d 
390 (Ind. 1988) (employee asserted that employer in wrongful discharge action 
estopped from challenging Employment Security Division ruling that he was fired 
for refusing to commit unlawful act). Since Burka and Salida, New York and 
Colorado have enacted statutory prohibitions on collateral estoppel based on 
unemployment compensation decisions. See infra note 315. Employees also have 
urged estoppel based on unemployment compensation determinations that the 
employee did not voluntarily quit employment. See, e.g, Board of Educ. v. Gray, 
806 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (employee unsuccessfully argued that decision 
of Unemployment Insurance Commission that employee did not voluntarily quit 
barred employer's defense to breach of contract suit). 
85. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 917 (1981) (employee stated claim for breach of implied contract based on 
oral representations and practice of terminating only for just cause). 
86. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (employment contracts contain implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, but action sounds in contract rather than tort); Fortune 
v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (court 
upheld jury finding that company violated covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
by bad faith termination of at will employee to prevent him from collecting 
commissions). 
87. Sees. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES 76, 112 (1985). . 
88. Id. at 112. The employer also will defend on the basis that no contract 
existed. Id. at 86. 
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proof of justifiable cause for termination may defeat the claim 
that the termination was in bad faith.89 
Because unemployment compensation benefits are designed to 
cushion the impact of lost income for employees unemployed 
involuntarily, 90 a common basis for denial of benefits is discharge 
for misconduct. 91 Arguments for applying collateral estoppel in 
wrongful discharge cases alleging breach of contract arise because 
the issues of just cause for discharge and the issues of termination 
for misconduct connected with the job overlap. This application 
is urged as providing the identity of issues required for preclusion 
purposes.92 Similarly, in cases alleging breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, there is overlap between a finding on 
the misconduct issue and a determination of whether there is bad 
faith with respect to the termination.93 
Additionally, there is potential for the application of collateral 
estoppel in the third category of wrongful discharge cases: dis-
89. See id. at 76. 
90. Price, Unemployment Insurance, Then and Now, 1935-85, 48 Soc. 
SECURITY BULL. No. 10 at 22, 24 (Oct. 1985). 
91. Under all state unemployment compensation laws, employees discharged 
for misconduct connected with work are denied benefits. Rosbrow, supra note 
57, at 28. As of January 1985, 39 states disqualified a claimant from benefits 
for the duration of unemployment, as opposed to disqualification for a specified 
period, where the claimant was discharged for misconduct. Price, supra note 90, 
at 30. In 1990, there were 649,968 denials of unemployment compensation claims 
based on discharge for misconduct, 34. 7 denials per 1000 spells of unemployment. 
Data from U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (on 
file with author). 
92. See, e.g., Spearman v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 717 
F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (employer barred from relitigating whether 
there was cause for discharge in breach of contract action based on determination 
in unemployment compensation proceeding that employee not discharged for just 
cause); Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Servs., 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 
486 (1984) (Unemployment Compensation Board's decision that employee dis-
charged for just cause bars breach of contract action); Carlson v. Federal Express 
Corp., 107 Lab. Cas. (CCH) tf 55,838 (1987) (former employee disqualified from 
receiving unemployment compensation benefits barred from relitigating issue of 
"good cause" discharge in breach of contract action). The same issue may arise 
in the context of an action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement requiring 
just cause for discharge. See Note, Issue Preclusion: Unemployment Compensa-
tion Determinations and § 301 Suits, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 862, 864-65 
(1981). 
93. See, e.g., Niles v. Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc., 241 Mont. 230, 786 
P.2d 662 (1990) (decision from administrative agency that employee not entitled 
to unemployment compensation does not bar employee's suit for wrongful 
discharge and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
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charge in violation of public policy. When an employee attempts 
to establish that a termination was motivated by a reason that 
violates public policy-for example, termination for filing a work-
ers' compensation claim94-an unemployment compensation deter-
mination that the employee was or was not discharged for 
misconduct may be urged to bind the court on that issue for 
purposes of the litigation. 95 While the increase in wrongful dis-
charge litigation has brought the issue of the collateral estoppel 
effect of unemployment compensation determinations to the fore-
front, both employers and employees have urged unemployment 
compensation determinations as bars in employment discrimination96 
litigation as well. 97 The core issue in employment discrimination 
94. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 
(1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); 
Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co. Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988). 
95. See, e.g., Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 
487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984) (doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded relitigation 
of prior administrative finding that employee discharged for theft of company 
property in action by employee asserting claims of slander, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, and wrongful discharge); Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Servs., 21 
Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984) (Unemployment Compensation Board's 
finding that employee was discharged for just cause based on her refusal to 
follow orders estops employee from raising issue of cause of her discharge in 
tort action for wrongful discharge). The unemployment compensation determi-
nation also may be urged as precluding relitigation of the question of whether 
the employee engaged in the misconduct alleged. See infra notes 126-28 and 
accompanying text. 
96. References to employment discrimination litigation herein refer to stat-
utory and constitutional claims alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, gender, age, disability, and exercise of constitutional or 
statutory rights. 
97. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 647 (11th 
Cir.), reh'g denied, 820 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1987) (decisions in unemployment 
compensation proceedings that plaintiffs in age discrimination case were dis-
charged for violating employer's policies denied preclusive effect); Mack v. South 
Bay Beer Distrib. Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1986) (Unemployment 
Compensation Appeals Board decision not given preclusive effect in age discrim-
ination suit); Hill v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 786 F.2d 550, 553-54 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(finding in unemployment compensation proceeding that plaintiff in race discrim-
ination case engaged in misconduct does not preclude litigation of whether 
employer engaged in race discrimination, but does preclude litigation of whether 
plaintiff engaged in misconduct); Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. 
Supp. 1417 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(in action by Secretary of Labor alleging employer discharged employee for 
complaining to union about violations of Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
determination in unemployment compensation proceeding that employee dis-
charged for walkjng off job had collateral estoppel effect against employee, but 
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cases is similar to that in public policy wrongful discharge cases: 
whether the discharge was motivated by employee misconduct or 
unlawful discrimination. 
In cases alleging constructive discharge,98 under either a wrong-
ful discharge theory or a discrimination theory, the issue of col-
lateral estoppel arises in a different context. 99 State unemployment 
compensation laws disqualify an employee who voluntarily quits 
employment without good cause from receiving benefits. 100 The 
determination on that issue is urged as preclusive in constructive 
discharge cases because of the issue overlap. 101 A binding deter-
finding that employee complained of health hazard to union, which reported 
complaint to company, did not have collateral estoppel effect against the com-
pany); Gore v. R.H. Macy & Co., 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1' 39,154 (1989) 
(decision of New York Unemployment Insurance administrative law judge that 
plaintiff in race discrimination case not discharged for misconduct did not 
preclude employer from establishing defense that plaintiff discharged for cause); 
Board of Educ. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 106 A.D.2d 364, 
482 N. Y.S.2d 495 (1984) (finding of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that 
plaintiff in race discrimination case discharged for her own misconduct not given 
preclusive effect); Salida School Dist. v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1164 (Colo. 
1987) (decision in unemployment compensation proceeding that employee dis-
missed because of her outspokenness not binding in action alleging that dismissal 
violated constitutional rights under first and fourteenth amendments to United 
States Constitution and article II of Colorado Constitution). While Salida was 
pending, Colorado amended its unemployment compensation statute to deny 
collateral estoppel effect to unemployment compensation proceedings. See Cow. 
REv. STAT. § 8-74-108 (West 1990). 
98. See supra note 6 (discussion of constructive discharge theory in various 
types of cases). 
99. See generally Pennington v. Kansas City Abrasive Co., 787 P.2d 742 
(Kan. App. 1990) (wrongful discharge); Rotert v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 623 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Conn. 1985) (age discrimination claim). 
100. Rosbrow, supra note 57, at 28. As of January 1985, 47 states disqual-
ified employees for the duration of their unemployment for voluntarily leaving 
their jobs. Price, supra note 90, at 30. In 1990, there were 1,080,244 denials of 
unemployment compensation benefits on the basis that the claimant voluntarily 
quit employment, 57. 7 denials per 1000 spells of unemployment. Data from U.S. 
Dep't of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (data on file at The 
Wayne Law Review). 
101. See, e.g., Rotert v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 623 F. Supp. 
1114 (D. Conn. 1985) (determination that employee voluntarily quit employment 
barred constructive discharge claim alleging age discrimination); Gear v. City of 
Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (determination in unemployment 
compensation proceeding that employee voluntarily quit without good cause 
barred sex discrimination action); Pennington v. Kansas City Abrasive Co., 787 
P.2d 742 (Kan. App. 1990) (determination of referee that employee did not 
voluntarily quit without good cause does not bar employer from relitigating 
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mination of whether an employee voluntarily quit without good 
cause overlaps with the question of whether there was a construc-
tive discharge. 102 
Courts faced with collateral estoppel arguments in discharge 
litigation based on unemployment compensation determinations 
have applied the standards for administrative preclusion to the 
issue and reached various conclusions. 103 Even courts denying 
collateral estoppel, however, frequently have relied on the facts of 
the particular dispute, not precluding the application of collateral 
estoppel in an appropriate factual context. 104 Most courts that have 
whether employee quit in subsequent retaliatory constructive discharge action); 
Weiler v. New Century Bank, 168 Mich. App. 354, 423 N.W.2d 664, vacated, 
431 Mich. 900, 42 N.W.2d 172 (1988) (unemployment compensation determination 
that employee voluntarily quit barred constructive discharge action alleging wrong-
ful discharge). 
102. See, e.g., Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 
1981) (determination that former officer left employment voluntarily and without 
good cause attributable to employer precluded relitigation of that issue in later 
sex discrimination action); Osborne v. Kelly, 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 565 N.E.2d 
1340, appeal denied, 137 Ill. 2d 266, 156 Ill. Dec. 563 (1991) (unemployment 
compensation determination that employee voluntarily quit disposes of employee's 
action for retaliatory discharge). 
103. As noted in one analysis of this issue, "courts have reached inconsistent 
results on virtually indistinguishable facts." Committee on Benefits to Unem-
ployed Persons, supra note 2, at 81. 
104. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1989) [hereinafter 
Unemployment Boards' Statement] (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appellate Bd); see, e.g., Osborne v. Kelly, 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 565 
N.E.2d 1340, appeal denied, 137 Ill. 2d 266, 156 Ill. Dec. 563 (1991) (finding 
preclusion appropriate although prior case, Godare v. Sterling Steel Casting, 103 
Ill. App. 3d 46, 430 N.E.2d 620 (1981) refused to bar wrongful discharge action 
based on Unemployment Compensation Board of Review decision); Hunt v. OSR 
Chem., Inc., 85 A.D.2d 681, 683, 445 N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 (1981) (refusing to 
apply collateral estoppel but citing prior case which "illustrat[ed] proper appli-
cation" of collateral estoppel in context of unemployment compensation decision 
and wrongful discharge suit). But see, Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 
379, 429 N.W.2d 169, 174 (1988) ("[W]e hold that MESC [Michigan Employment 
Security Commission] determinations are not to be used to collaterally estop the 
litigation of issues in a subsequent civil suit."). A number of states, including 
New York, have legislation that prohibits the use of unemployment compensation 
determinations to collaterally estop litigation of related employment termination 
cases. See supra note 3; see also H.R. REP. No. 5835 (lOlst Cong., 2nd Sess., 
136 CONG. REc. 12,423, 12,676 (October 26, 1990)). Other states have rejected 
such legislation. Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra at 101. See infra notes 
316-38 and accompanying text for further discussion of proposed federal legis-
lation. 
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denied preclusion have done so on the basis that the facts of the 
case do not meet the standards for preclusion by an administrative 
agency decision as set forth in Utah Construction and the Restate-
ment of Judgments. 105 Other courts have cited other policy reasons 
supporting their refusal to preclude litigation.106 A review of ju-
dicial application of collateral estoppel based on unemployment 
compensation decisions will assist in an analysis of whether pre-
clusion is appropriate. 
J. Cases Denying Preclusion 
Failure to meet the standards for giving preclusive effect to 
administrative decisions has doomed preclusion arguments in many 
cases. 
a. Lack of Issue Identity 
In a number of cases, courts have held that the issue identity 
required for collateral estoppel is not present.107 This argument has 
prevailed in both discrimination cases108 and wrongful discharge cases.100 
105. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text for discussion of these 
standards. 
106. See Delgado, 815 F.2d at 647 (deference to unemployment compensation 
determinations could cause employees to forego unemployment compensation to 
avoid jeopardizing ADEA claims or force employers and employees to litigate 
discrimination claims in unemployment compensation proceedings, creating hard-
ship for parties and others whose benefits will be delayed as result); Mack, 798 
F.2d at 1284 (employees may forfeit unemployment benefits to avoid adversely 
affecting discrimination claims, and employers and employees may be forced to 
litigate every unemployment compensation claim as if it were discrimination case, 
jeopardizing expeditious process of claims for unemployment benefits). These 
policy reasons constitute an application of the Restatement's exception to appli-
cation of collateral estoppel where legislative policy indicates that the decision of 
the first tribunal should not be given preclusive effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGldENTS § 83(4) (1982). 
107. See cases cited infra notes 110-23. 
108. See, e.g., Nickens v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 569 (W.D. 
Mo. 1986). 
109. See, e.g., Zlotnicki v. Harsco Corp., 672 F. Supp. 161, 163 (M.D. Pa. 
1987) (whether employee's conduct constituted willful misconduct that would 
disqualify him for unemployment compensation benefits not identical to issue 
whether employer had good cause to terminate employee's employment); Luedtke 
v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 n.5 (Alaska 1989) (decision 
in unemployment compensation proceeding that employee's refusal to take drug 
test not disqualifying misconduct does not collaterally estop employer's claim 
that he was discharged for just cause); Star Pharmacy Inc. v. Roberts, 96 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3287, 3289 (1977) (misconduct under unemployment compen-
sation statutes not same as good cause under collective bargaining agreement). 
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In Nelson v. Crimson Enterprises, Inc., 110 the Wyoming Supreme 
Court rejected the.~employee's argument that the Wyoming Em-
ployment Security Commission decision that his termination was 
not for cause precluded relitigation of the issue of whether he was 
terminated wrongfully in violation of either public policy or the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 111 The court's decision 
was based on its conclusion that the issue of · 
whether or not Nelson was discharged for misconduct so 
as to disqualify him for benefits is distinct from the ques-
tion of whether or not Nelson's firing, as an at-will em-
ployee, was wrongful . ... Any notion of preclusion, based 
upon the prior Commission proceeding, requires, at a min-
imum, that the specific issue before the Commission be the 
same as the issue before this court (emphasis in original). 112 
In Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 113 the Illinois Appellate Court 
carefully explained its conclusion that the issues of disqualifying 
110. 777 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1989). Wyoming now provides by statute that 
decisions of any tribunal regarding unemployment compensation are not binding, 
conclusive or admissible in any other action between the employee and the 
employer. See WYO. STAT. § 27-3-406(c) (1991). The Nelson court discussed the 
statute, which went into effect after the Unemployment Commission's hearing, 
and concluded that it need not decide the applicability of the statute to the case 
because the statute merely codified existing law. 777 P.2d at 78. 
111. 777 P.2d at 78. Accord Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 
P.2d 1123, 1130 n.5 (Alaska 1989). 
112. 777 P .2d at 78. The court also noted that the issue of wrongful 
termination "was never fully and fairly litigated before the Commission, nor was 
it distinctly and directly ruled upon by the Commission." Id. (citation omitted). 
This statement illustrates both the interrelationship of the elements necessary for 
collateral estoppel and the significance of the court's determination on the 
question of issue identity. If the issues are not identical, then a fortiori, the issue 
in the judicial forum could not have been fully and fairly litigated in the 
administrative forum, nor could the issue sought to be precluded in the judicial 
forum have been actually litigated and essential to the decision of the adminis-
trative tribunal. On the other hand, even where the issue is identical, the other 
elements necessary for the application of preclusion may be lacking. See supra 
note 110 for a discussion of the court's reliance on the law of preclusion as 
codified in the Wyoming statutes in 1988. Accord Niles v. Carl Weissman & 
Sons, Inc., 241 Mont. 230, 786 P.2d 662 (1990) (collateral estoppel rejected 
because issues in unemployment proceeding not identical to issues in suit based 
on wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing). 
113. 189 Ill. App. 3d 450, 545 N.E.2d 337 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 
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misconduct under unemployment compensation law and "just 
cause" such as "dishonesty or other misconduct" under a con-
tractually binding employment manual were not identical. 114 
Section 602A of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act 
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 432(a)), applicable in 
unemployment compensation matters, defines "miscon-
duct" as a "deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable 
rule or policy." Jewel's employment manual, on the other 
hand, states that a permanent employee may be discharged 
only for "just cause", such as "dishonesty or other mis-
conduct." The manual does not provide for or require 
deliberate or willful conduct. Nor can it be assumed that 
the term "misconduct" as used in the manual has the same 
meaning as "misconduct" as used in the statute. The 
language of the employment manual does not in itself 
reference willful or deliberate conduct. Further, the testi-
mony of Jewel's supervisor that the disciplinary rules in 
the manual require a showing of "intent" to be enforced 
is not sufficient to show that such a meaning was intended 
by the language of the manual. m 
The court went on to say, quoting the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Jackson v. Board of Review, 116 
[E]very justifiable discharge does not disqualify the dis-
charged employee from receiving employment [sic] benefits 
under the Act. An employee's conduct may be such that 
the employer may properly discharge him. However, such 
conduct may not constitute 'misconduct connected with his 
work' which disqualifies the employee from receiving un-
employment benefits. 117 
142 Ill. 2d 152, 568 N.E.2d 827 (1990). In reversing the appellate court, the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that summary judgment was improperly granted 
against the plaintiff since there was a factual issue of whether the employer 
violated its employment manual in discharging the plaintiff. On the issue of 
collateral estoppel, however, the court agreed with the appellate court's denial 
of summary judgment for the plaintiff. 
114. Id. at 455, 545 N.E.2d at 340. 
115. Id., 545 N.E.2d at 340-41. 
116. 105 Ill. 2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879 (1985). 
117. 189 Ill. App. 3d at 456, 545 N.E.2d at 341 (quoting Jackson, 105 Ill. 
2d at 507, 475 N.E.2d at 882-83). 
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Based on this analysis, the court found that estoppel did not apply 
because the issue of misconduct under the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, which was resolved in the plaintiff's favor, was not the 
same as the issue of whether the employer had just cause to 
discharge him. us 
The absence of identical issues has precluded collateral estoppel 
application in employment discrimination cases as well. In Salida 
School District v. Morrison, 119 the plaintiff alleged that her dis-
charge violated her constitutional right to free speech. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court relied on the lack of issue identity, among 
other factors, 120 to deny preclusive effect to an unemployment 
118. Id. Accord Willoughby v. Gencorp, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (Ky. 
App. 1990). The court there stated: 
Neither the umpire in the arbitration proceeding nor the unemployment 
hearing officer had the ability to litigate Willoughby's tort claim for 
wrongful termination in retaliation for pursuing workers' compensation 
benefits ..•. That both found that Gencorp had a legitimate reason to 
fire Willoughby does not preclude a jury from determining that the 
purported reason was a pretext and that the employer was motivated by 
impermissible reasons in discharging Willoughby. 
See also Niles v. Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc., 241 Mont. 230, 786 P.2d 662 
(1990) (court refused to give collateral estoppel effect to unemployment compen-
sation denial in action for wrongful discharge and breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing because issues not identical); White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 
Neb. 11, 22, 430 N.W.2d 27, 34 (1988) (court refused to preclude employer in 
wrongful discharge case from claiming, based on unemployment compensation 
decision, that employees engaged in misconduct, noting that employment security 
statute provided only that determinations thereunder were conclusive for purposes 
of that law); Hunt v. OSR Chem., Inc., 85 A.D.2d 681, 683, 445 N.Y.S.2d 499, 
502 (1981) (breach of contract claim involved complex issues relating to several 
intertwined contracts that were not and could not have been litigated in unem-
ployment compensation proceeding, which precludes application of estoppel); 
Zlotnicki v. Harsco Corp., 672 F. Supp. 161, 163 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("The issue 
in this case is whether the defendants had good cause to terminate Zlotnicki's 
employment. That issue was not before the administrative agency or the Com-
monwealth Court in the unemployment compensation proceedings."); Caras v. 
Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586 (D. Utah 1988) (lack of identity of 
issues precludes giving collateral estoppel effect to unemployment compensation 
determination in plaintiff's subsequent lawsuit alleging breach of employment 
contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and termination in 
violation of public policy). 
119. 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). 
120. The court also relied on differences in remedies and procedures in the 
two actions and the absence of the employer's incentive to defend a claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 1164. See further discussion of these 
reasons for denying collateral estoppel infra notes 124-55 and accompanying text. 
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compensation determination. 121 Similarly, in Nickens v. W.W. 
Grainger, Inc., 122 a federal district court applying Missouri law 
held that an unemployment compensation agency decision that an 
employee did not engage in misconduct sufficient to disqualify him 
for unemployment benefits did not have preclusive effect in a 
subsequent race discrimination suit because the issues were not 
identical. 123 
b. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate the Issue. 
Closely related to the requirement of issue identity is the Utah 
Construction standard that denies preclusion where the party against 
whom preclusion is being applied did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first forum. 124 A number of 
courts have denied preclusion because this standard was not met, 
121. 732 P.2d at 1164. The plaintiff was seeking to collaterally estop the 
defendant from asserting the defense that she was not discharged for her speech 
on the basis of the decision by the referee on her unemployment claim that she 
was terminated for her outspokenness. 
122. 645 F. Supp. 569, 570-71 (W.D. Mo. 1986). 
123. Id. The court stated: 
The requirement that the issue previously adjudicated be identical to the 
one presently under consideration is not met in this case. In order to 
support its award of unemployment compensation to plaintiff, the 
Missouri commission had only to find that he had not engaged in 
"misconduct" resulting in his termination. In contrast, to prevail on his 
§ 1981 claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally discrim-
inated against him because of his race. Although both issues may 
ultimately tum on the factual circumstances demonstrating plaintiff's 
compliance or non-compliance with defendant's attendance policy, de-
termination of one issue does not foretell the outcome of the other. 
Id. at 570. 
124. Frequently courts will deny collateral estoppel because the significant 
issue in the second proceeding, discriminatory discharge for example, was not 
fully and fairly litigated in the unemployment hearing. See Board of Educ. v. 
New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 106 A.D.2d 364, 482 N.Y.S.2d 495, 
497 (1984) (decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that plaintiff 
discharged for misconduct denied preclusive effect in discrimination action where 
allegation that she was subjected to racial slur only briefly explored at informal 
unemployment hearing); Hunt v. OSR Chem., Inc., 85 A.D.2d 681, 445 N.Y.S.2d 
499, 502 (1981) (findings in unemployment proceeding not given preclusive effect 
because of both lack of issue identity and lack of full and fair opportunity to 
litigate, where unemployment proceeding was short hearing against only one 
defendant, and issues of breach of contract not adequately addressed). 
1992] PRECLUSIVE EFFECT 1827 
focusing on several different rationales. 125 First, some courts have 
denied collateral estoppel effect where the issue sought to be 
litigated in the second suit was not fully explored in the unem-
ployment compensation litigation. For example, in Hill v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 126 the court refused to preclude the employee's 
racial discrimination claim after the Unemployment Insurance Ap-
peals Board found that he was properly terminated for misconduct 
because the "claim of race discrimination was barely mentioned"127 
at the appeals board hearing. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was pre-
cluded from relitigating the issue of whether he engaged in mis-
conduct.128 Similarly, in Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co.,129 the 
court denied preclusive effect since the employees did not have an 
adequate opportunity to litigate their age discrimination claims in 
the evidentiary hearing on the unemployment compensation claims. 
The Delgado court noted that there was no indication that the 
plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence in support of their 
discrimination claims in the unemployment hearing. 130 
A second aspect of the requirement of a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue in the administrative proceeding relates 
to the litigation incentive. The Restatement provides that collateral 
estoppel should not apply where a party "did not have an adequate 
125. In Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 423 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 
49 (1981), the New York Court of Appeals recited a number of factors relevant 
to the determination of whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
a prior determination. The court stated: 
[W]hen collateral estoppel is in issue, the question as to whether a party 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination, involves 
a practical inquiry into the "the realities of litigation. A comprehensive 
list of the various factors which should enter into a determination 
whether a party has had his day in court would include such consider-
ations as the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use 
of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience 
of counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise 
verdict, differences in the applicable law and foreseeability of future 
litigation" (see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS [Tent. Draft 
No. 3] § 88). 
Id. at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 809, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51 (quoting Schwartz v. Public 
Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 
(1969)). 
126. 786 F.2d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1986). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. 815 F.2d 641, 647 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied en bane, 820 F.2d 1231 
(11th Cir. 1987). 
130. Id. Evidence in support of the age discrimination case included "dis-
parate treatment of younger employees guilty of the same offense." Id. 
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. . . incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action." 131 The comments to this Restatement section suggest that 
it would be unfair to preclude a party from relitigating an issue 
when the amount in controversy in the first action is significantly 
smaller than that in the second.132 Courts have denied preclusive 
effect to unemployment compensation proceedings because, for 
both parties, there is a significant difference between the amount 
at stake in an unemployment compensation proceeding and the 
amount at stake in a wrongful discharge or employment discrim-
ination case. 133 At most, in an unemployment compensation pro-
ceeding, the employer faces a future increase in the experience-
based insurance rate if the employee prevails. 134 On the other hand, 
a wrongful discharge or employment discrimination action poses 
a threat of significant cost to the employer. 135 Similarly, for the 
131. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(c) (1982). 
132. Id., comment j. 
133. See, e.g., Nickens v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 569, 571 
(W.D. Mo. 1986) (declining to apply collateral estoppel in § 1981 discrimination 
claim when parties lacked incentive to litigate fully in unemployment compensation 
dispute); see also Ferris v. Hawkins, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 n.3 (Ariz. App. 1983) 
(declining to apply collateral estoppel when amount in controversy in unemploy-
ment case was $1530 and amount in controversy in action under state personnel 
law was $17,715.77, plus reinstatement). 
134. Committee on Benefits to Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 74-
75. An award to one employee of benefits may not have even that minimal 
impact. Id. See, e.g., Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 590 
(D. Utah 1988) ("Defendants did not have an incentive to fully and fairly litigate 
the issue as the only adverse effects to the defendants would be payment of 
unemployment compensation, a minimal amount compared to the amount in 
controversy in this case [alleging violations of the ADEA and Title VII as well 
as breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy]."); Fetherston v. ASARCO, 
Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (D. Mont. 1986), rev'd without opinion, 827 F.2d 
772 (9th Cir. 1987) (employer who did not appeal department of labor decision 
that employee not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits on basis of 
misconduct not estopped from relitigating issue of misconduct in wrongful 
discharge case because in unemployment compensation action, company not at 
risk of having to pay damages "out of its own pocket"); Salida School Dist. v. 
Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1167 (Colo. 1987) (incentive to litigate unemployment 
compensation issues significantly different than incentive to litigate civil discharge 
claims, because unemployment compensation taxes remain "relatively constant" 
despite variation caused by payout of claims). 
135. In one such case, the Supreme Court of Colorado explained: 
The liability that the School District incurs when a discharged employee 
is granted [unemployment] benefits is significantly different than the 
relief awarded to Morrison by the trial court, which included a two-
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employee, the potential recovery in an unemployment compensa-
tion proceeding is much smaller than the possible award in a civil 
suit alleging unlawful discharge. 136 Some courts have found that 
the application of collateral estoppel is precluded when the lack 
of incentive to litigate combines with the lack of foreseeability 
that the unemployment determination will bar litigation in a sub-
sequent suit in which both parties have a much greater stake. 137 
year reinstatement and back pay and costs in excess of $31,000 •..• 
The School District had a greater incentive to defend Morrison's section 
1983 claim than it had to defend her claim for benefits. 
Salida, 732 P.2d at 1167. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 
221-38 and accompanying text. 
136. See, e.g., Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 
(9th Cir. 1986) ("[M]oreover, an employee's incentive to litigate an unemployment 
benefits claim is generally much less than his incentive to litigate a discrimination 
claim where generally the stakes are much higher."). See also Lewis v. IBM 
Corp. 393 F. Supp. 305 (D. Or. 1974) (findings in unemployment compensation 
proceeding in which maximum amount at stake is $1,612 do not preclude litigation 
in breach of contract action when plaintiff sought $500,000 in damages because 
employee did not have adequate incentive to litigate issues in unemployment 
compensation hearing); Hunt v. OSR Chemicals, Inc., 85 A.D.2d 681, 445 
N.Y.S.2d 499 (1981) ("[o]f equal weight [in denying preclusive effect], the size 
of plaintiff's claim for unemployment insurance benefits pales in importance 
compared to plaintiff's claims involved here."). 
In 1982, the average total amount of unemployment benefits received by 
claimants in New York was $1,500. Committee on Labor and Employment Law 
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Unemployment Insurance 
Decisions and the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, 40 THE REc. 738, 743 (1985) 
[hereinafter New York Bar Committee Report]. While the amount has increased 
since that time due to increases in maximum benefits, id. at 743 n.28, it pales 
by comparison to the amount at stake in discharge actions. See infra notes 227, 
231 for data regarding recoveries in wrongful discharge and discrimination suits. 
As of September 1988, the maximum weekly unemployment benefit for all states 
ranged from a low of $96.00 to a high of $268.00, excluding dependent allowances 
provided by 14 states. Unemployment Insurance, supra note 4, at 22. Minimum 
weekly benefits varied from $5 to $58. Id. at 25. Most states have a maximum 
of 26 weeks for collection of benefits. Id. at 23-24. There is a program of 
extended benefits during periods of high unemployment. Id. at 25. Prior to very 
recent legislative provisions of extended benefits, see infra note 229, extended 
benefits were difficult to obtain, however. Rejda & Lee, State Unemployment 
Compensation Programs: Immediate Reforms Needed. 56 J. RlsK AND INS. 649, 
656 (1989). In December, 1988, the unemployed workers re<;eiving benefits av-
eraged $145 per week, and the average duration of benefits for the 12 months 
ending December, 1988, was 13.9 weeks. Unemployment Insurance, supra note 
4, at 22. 
137. See Dusovic v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 124 A.D.2d 
634, 508 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1986), appeal dismissed without opinion, 70 N.Y.2d 747, 
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The reduced amount at stake in an unemployment compensa-
tion proceeding discourages the parties from employing attorneys 
in such proceedings-a third factor encompassed in the adequacy 
of the full and fair opportunity to litigate. 138 Courts have relied 
on the absence of counsel to find that a party against whom 
estoppel is urged did not have a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate, thereby precluding estoppel. 139 
514 N.E.2d 391, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1987). The court stated: 
In this case, the defendant did not initiate the administrative proceeding, 
and, at that prior proceeding, the defendant was not represented by 
counsel and only produced hearsay evidence in support of its defense. 
There is no suggestion that the defendant was aware of the possibility 
that an award of unemployment benefits to the plaintiff might later be 
used to conclusively establish liability in this suit for damages in the 
amount of $45,000, which action was not initiated until after the issuance 
of the Administrative Law Judge's decision. 
The court contrasted the case with an earlier New York case, Ryan v. New York 
Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984), in which 
the court applied collateral estoppel against the plaintiff employee because he 
initiated the unemployment proceeding and had the incentive to litigate the issue 
of his termination. 508 N.Y.S.2d at 28. Accord Fetherston v. ASARCO Inc., 
635 F. Supp.1443 (D. Mont. 1986), rev'd without opinion 827 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 
1987) ("Had ASARCO foreseen that its failure to oppose plaintiff's application 
for redetermination [of unemployment compensation benefits] would somehow 
serve to foreclose its opportunity to defend a wrongful termination action, it 
surely would not have chosen a passive course of action in the administrative 
proceedings."); Lewis v. IBM Corp., 393 F. Supp. 305, 308-09 (D. Or. 1974) 
(court refused to collaterally estop plaintiffs litigation of breach of contract 
action because of lack of incentive to vigorously litigate at administrative level 
and lack of foreseeability of preclusive effect). 
138. A 1979 study by the National Commission on Unemployment Compen-
sation found that only seven percent of claimants and nine percent of employers 
are represented by counsel at unemployment compensation hearings. New York 
Bar Committee Report, supra note 136, at 742-43. Where the employer was 
represented by counsel and the claimant was not, the claimant's success rate was 
thirty percent. Where both parties were represented by counsel the claimant's 
success rate rose to fifty percent. Id. In Mack v. South Bay Distrib., 798 F.2d 
1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1986), the court noted that the amicus brief filed by the 
California Chamber of Commerce indicated that employers did not use counsel 
in unemployment compensation proceedings. 
139. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 
(S.D.N. Y. 1988) (factual issue whether parties represented by counsel in unem-
ployment compensation hearing relevant to issue whether collateral estoppel 
applies in civil action based on U.S. and New York constitutional claims); 
McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. S. Ct. 1988) 
(refusing to apply collateral estoppel to bar relitigation by employer of issue 
whether employee discharged for refusal to commit illegal act, finding no full 
and fair opportunity to litigate issue in unemployment hearing, relying in part 
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The fourth factor frequently cited by courts finding the absence 
of an adequate opportunity to litigate an issue in the unemployment 
compensation forum is the lack of the full panoply of procedural 
protections available in judicial proceedings. 140 This factor is also 
relevant to the determination of whether the administrative agency 
was acting in a judicial capacity, one of the Utah Construction 
factors for application of collateral estoppel. 141 Courts have cited 
the procedural differences between unemployment proceedings and 
judicial proceedings to deny collateral estoppel on both bases. In 
Pennington v. Kansas City Abrasive Co. 142 the court cited a number 
of differences between unemployment proceedings and judicial 
proceedings to support its conclusion that preclusion should not 
apply. Principal among these differences was the statutory admis-
sibility of hearsay evidence in the unemployment proceeding. 143 
The court also cited the different placement of the burden of 
proof in the two proceedings. 144 In the unemployment compensa-
tion proceeding, the employer had the burden of proving that the 
on absence of counsel for either party); Dusovic v. New Jersey Transit Bus 
Operations, Inc., 124 A.D.2d 634, 508 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (1986), appeal dismissed 
without opinion, 70 N.Y.2d 747, 514 N.E.2d 391, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1987) 
(finding of no employee misconduct in unemployment compensation proceeding 
does not preclude employer from litigating that issue in defending employee's 
breach of contract action. Employer did not have full and fair opportunity to 
litigate issue in unemployment hearing because it was not represented by counsel.). 
140. Although administrative proceedings are less formal than judicial pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel based on admin-
istrative proceedings is appropriate. See Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 452-53. 
Supporters of collateral estoppel have urged that the procedural limitations of 
unemployment hearings are not unique and do not support denial of collateral 
estoppel. Committee on Benefits to Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 80-
81. 
141. See supra notes 28, 51 and accompanying text. 
142. 787 P.2d 742 (Kan. App. 1990) (1990 Kan. App. Lexis 79). 
143. 1990 Kan. App. Lexis 79 at 6 (1990). Accord Dusovic, 124, A.D.2d 
634, 508 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (1986), appeal denied without opinion, 70 N.Y.2d 747, 
514 N.E.2d 391, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1033 (1987) ("[T]he defendant did not initiate the 
administrative proceeding, and, at that prior proceeding [unemployment compen-
sation hearing], the defendant was not represented by counsel and only produced 
hearsay evidence in support of its defense."); McClanahan v. Remington Freight 
Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d at 395 ("Inasmuch as the rules of evidence do not strictly 
apply to administrative proceedings, a substantial amount of hearsay potentially 
inadmissible at trial was introduced without objection."). 
144. 1990 Kan. App. Lexis 79 at 7. Notably, however, not all states place 
the burden of proof on the employer in unemployment compensation proceedings. 
See Committee on Benefits to Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 76 n.16 
and cases cited therein. 
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employee quit without good cause and was disqualified from 
receiving benefits. 145 In the wrongful discharge case, the burden 
was on the employee to prove that he was discharged. 146 Accord-
ingly, the court declined to afford preclusive effect to the referee's 
determination that the plaintiff was discharged. 147 
Similarly, in Clapper v. Budget Oil Co., 148 the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals concluded that the procedural nature of unemployment 
compensation hearings precluded the full and fair opportunity to 
be heard which was required for application of collateral estop-
pel.149 The court relied on several factors, including: the informality 
of the hearings; 150 the inapplicability of the statutory rules of 
evidence and procedure; the admissibility of, and reliance on, 
hearsay; 151 the absence of juries, and the emphasis on "speedy 
resolution" of claims.152 Some of the same factors prompted denial 
of estoppel in McC/anahan v. Remington Freight Lines, lnc., 153 
where the court denied estoppel inter alia because the referee acted 
as the primary questioner in the hearing and the "[c]ross-exami-
nation was minimal and ineffective." 154 The unavailability of dis-
145. 1990 Kan. App. Lexis 79 at 7. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. The court also relied on the lack of incentive to litigate. Id. at 8. 
148. 437 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
149. Id. at 727. Accord Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]e do not believe that the procedures utilized in the 
unemployment system either grant any party a full, true opportunity to litigate 
issues, or even encourage any meaningful participation in the process."). 
150. 437 N.W.2d at 726. Similarly, in Fetherston v. ASARCO, Inc., 635 F. 
Supp. 1443, 1446 (D. Mont. 1986), rev'd without opinion, 827 F.2d 772 (9th 
Cir. 1987), the court relied on the absence of a formal hearing to support its 
denial of collateral estoppel, noting that there was no evidence that a formal 
hearing was ever held. The court added that "[g]enerally Montana unemployment 
compensation procedures are very informal, often handled by the mere completion 
of forms or over the telephone." Id. at 1446. In Niles v. Carl Weissman & Sons, 
Inc., 241 Mont. 230, 236-37, 786 P.2d 662, 666 (1990), the court also noted that 
there were "telephonic hearings which may not have afforded Niles the full right 
of cross-examination," but found it unnecessary to decide whether the adminis-
trative proceeding "complied with judicial standards of substantive and procedural 
due process" because the issues were not the same; on that basis the court denied 
preclusion. ' · 
151. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
152. 437 N. W .2d at 726. 
153. 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988). . 
154. Id. at 395. Similarly, in Hunt v. OSR Chem. Inc., 85 A.D.2d 681, 445 
N.Y.S.2d 499, 502, (App. Div. 1981), the court noted that the lack of formality 
of the unemployment hearing and the limited time devoted to the hearing weighed 
on the side of rejecting collateral estoppel. 
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covery and the lack of sufficient time to investigate the facts and 
prepare for litigation-given the rapid processing of unemployment 
compensation claims-also have been cited to support denial of 
preclusive effect. 1ss 
c. Public Policy 
In addition to the failure to comply with the judicial prere-
quisites for applicability of collateral estoppel, some courts have 
cited policy reasons to support the refusal to accord collateral 
estoppel effect to unemployment compensation decisions.1s5 Fore-
most among these policy reasons is the impact on the unemploy-
ment compensation system. As stated by the court in Mack v. 
South Bay Beer Distributors, 
[T]he potentially higher awards at stake in discrimination 
claims could compel both employers and employees to 
litigate every unemployment benefits claim as if it encom-
passed a discrimination suit. Should this come to pass the 
Board may find it difficult to. adjudicate unemployment 
benefit claims expeditiously. Consequently, an unemployed 
worker would be without benefits for a longer period of 
time than would be the case if his appeal had been decided 
without the additional delay created by determining a dis-
crimination claim.1s7 
155. See Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. 
Utah 1988). 
156. The courts applying these policy rationales rely, either explicitly or 
implicitly, on the exception to preclusion in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 83(A) (1982), where the legislative policy indicates either that the decision of 
the first tribunal should not be given preclusive effect or that the second tribunal 
should be allowed to make an independent decision. See id. § 83(4). 
157. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib. Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 
1986). Notably, in Mack, the California Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus 
brief in support of the employee's contention that collateral estoppel should not 
apply. Id. at 1284 n.6. The Chamber of Commerce argued that application of 
collateral estoppel would "significantly alter the operating structure of California's 
Unemployment Compensation System by making expeditious hearings a thing of 
the past." See Cavanagh, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative 
Unemployment Insurance Decisions in Subsequent State and Federal Litigation, 
4 THE LAB. LAW. 839, 847-859 (1986) (discussion of development of collateral 
estoppel in California prior to enactment of legislation barring courts from 
according collateral estoppel effect to California unemployment compensation 
decisions). 
Other courts have relied on the same policy rationale to deny preclusion. In 
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The court in Mack suggested two other policy reasons for denying 
preclusion. First, employees might be forced to forego unemploy-
ment compensation benefits "rather that risk an adverse ruling 
that could have preclusive effect on a federal discrimination claim 
that [they] may not be adequately prepared to litigate before the 
Board."158 This would interfere with the policy underlying the 
unemployment compensation statutes. 159 Second, according collat-
eral estoppel effect to unemployment compensation determinations 
would encourage employers to rely on attorneys in such proceedings 
while unemployed workers frequently would be unable to afford 
counsel, 160 thereby disadvantaging employees both in the unem-
ployment proceeding and in the later civil litigation. 161 The Arizona 
Court of Appeals in Ferris v. Hawkins relied on the latter policy 
Lewis v. IBM Corp., 393 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D. Or. 1974), the court cited a 
brief submitted by the state of Oregon to support its denial of preclusion because 
of the adverse impact on state administrative procedures. The brief asserted that 
according preclusive effect would increase the "length and complexity of hear-
ings," rendering existing staffing inadequate to handle compensation claims. 
Accord, Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 647 (11th Cir.), reh'g 
denied en bane, 820 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1987). The court there stated: 
Granting deference to unreviewed decisions of [the Georgia Employment 
Security Agency] in subsequent [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] 
lawsuits could cause potential plaintiffs to forego their chance at un-
employment compensation for fear of jeopardizing their ADEA claims 
or else force employees and employers to litigate unemployment com-
pensation claims as discrimination suits. Such a result would work a 
hardship, not only on the parties, but on other unemployed persons 
awaiting determination of their claims. · 
Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]e can 
easily imagine the untenable burden which would be placed on the [unemployment 
compensation] system were we to hold that any findings could conceivably bind 
all the parties in later proceedings."). 
158. Mack, 798 F.2d at 1284. 
159. Id. The unemployment insurance compensation program is the "first 
line of defense for ... [a worker] ordinarily steadily employed ... for a limited 
period during which there is expectation that he will soon be reemployed. This 
should be a contractual right not dependent on any means test .... It will carry 
workers over most, if not all, periods of unemployment in normal times without 
resort to any other form of assistance." Rep. of the Comm. on Economic 
Security, Hearings on S. 1130 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess., at 1321-22 cited in California Dep't. of Human Resources Dev. v. 
Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131 (1971). 
160. Mack, 798 F.2d at 1284. 
161. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (noting that when employers 
are represented by counsel and employees are not, the employee in an unem-
ployment compensation proceeding has a thirty percent success rate. When both 
parties are represented, the employee's success rate improves to fifty percent). 
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consideration to reject the employee's argument that findings in 
an unemployment proceeding barred relitigation of a discharge 
claim under the state personnel statute. 162 The court, in addition 
to relying on the dissimilarity of the statutory schemes and remedies 
thereunder, 163 noted, 
if we were to adopt the position advocated by Ferris, we . 
would create an incentive for the state, acting in its capacity 
as an employer, to vigorously and consistently oppose a 
discharged employee's claim for benefits. The result would 
be to tum the unemployment compensation hearing into a 
litigation of the merits of the personnel claim. The ultimate 
effect would be that the state's superior resources would 
interfere with the beneficial purpose of the unemployment 
compensation laws. 164 
The Michigan Supreme Court relied on these same policy consid-
erations to support its conclusion that the Michigan Legislature 
did not intend that unemployment compensation determinations 
be given preclusive effect in other proceedings.165 
162. Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 333, 660 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1983). 
163. Id. at 332-33, 660 P.2d at 1259-60. The court cited the differences in 
the amount in controversy in the two proceedings. See further discussion of this 
issue supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
164. 135 Ariz. at 333, 660 P.2d at 1260. Earlier, the court noted: 
Unemployment compensation is a 'social security' measure which is 
designed to alleviate the 'burden which • • . falls with crushing force 
upon the unemployed worker and his family.' A.R.S. § 23-601. The 
central purpose of our employment security act, establishing within 
Arizona a system of unemployment compensation, is to allow compen-
sation for a limited period of time to those capable of working and 
available for work who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault 
of their own. (citation omitted). 
Id. at 332, 660 P.2d at 1259. 
165. See Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988). The 
court relied on the exception for collateral estoppel recited in Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments, which provides that an adjudicative decision by an administrative 
agency should not be given preclusive effect if it is incompatible with a legislative 
policy to the contrary. Id. at 377, 429 N.W.2d at 173 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982)). See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
The court found that preclusive effect would be incompatible with the legislative 
policy that benefits be provided to the unemployed worker as quickly as possible 
because: 1) the parties would be forced to litigate the administrative claim more 
extensively because of the potential effect on a civil claim, delaying the deter-
mination of benefits and burdening the unemployment compensation system; 2) 
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Public policy underlying the statute creating the civil cause of 
action also may warrant denial of collateral estoppel. In Hahn v. 
Arbat Systems Limited, Inc., 166 the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Appellate Division, relied on the strong public policy against 
employment discrimination to reject the employer's argument that 
an unemployment compensation decision finding that the plaintiff 
was not discriminated against barred the plaintiff in a later civil 
action alleging unlawful discrimination. 167 
2. Cases Granting Preclusive Effect 
In contrast to the series of cases analyzed above, in which 
courts applied requirements for administrative collateral estoppel 
and public policy to deny preclusion, there stand a number of 
a claimant might be forced to "forego a claim for unemployment compensation" 
benefits to preserve the "right to pursue a civil claim;" and 3) an unemployed 
worker, unaware of the possible impact of the unemployment compensation 
determination on any potential civil claim, might unwittingly sacrifice the civil 
claim in the unemployment proceeding, particularly in light of the fact that 
employees frequently are unrepresented by counsel. Storey at 337-39, 429 N.W.2d 
at 174. 
The Storey decision resolved an issue that had split the lower courts and the 
federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of the Michigan 
statute. Id. at 372 n.l, 374-76, 429 N.W.2d at 171 n.l, 172-73. The Michigan 
statute states: 
Except as provided in this act, such information and determinations 
shall not be used in any action or proceeding before any court or 
administrative tribunal unless the commission is a party to or a com-
plainant in the action or proceeding, or unless used for the prosecution 
of fraud, civil proceeding, or other legal proceeding pursuant to sub-
division (2). 
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.ll(b)(l) (West Supp. 1992). One panel of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals in Storey, and the Sixth Circuit in Polk v. Yellow 
Freight Sys., 801 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1986), found § 421.1 l(b)(l) inapplicable. 
Another panel of the court of appeals, in Moody v. Westin Renaissance Co., 
162 Mich. App. 743, 748, 413 N.W.2d 96, 98 (1987), specifically rejected that 
analysis of § 421.ll(b)(l). In addition, the Sixth Circuit failed to cite a prior 
Sixth Circuit case which had applied § ll(b)(l) in a context at odds with its 
interpretation in Polk. Storey, 431 Mich. at 376, 429 N.W.2d at 173 (citing 
Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1966)). The 
Michigan Supreme Court resolved this dispute in Storey, interpreting § 1 l(b)(l) 
to preclude according collateral estoppel effect to unemployment compensation 
determinations. See Note, The Estoppel Effect of Misconduct Findings in Un-
employment Compensation Adjudications in Future Civil Suits for Wrongful 
Discharge, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 1695 (1988) (critical discussion of Michigan's 
approach to this issue). 
166. 200 N.J. Super. 266, 491 A.2d 58 (1985). 
167. See Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) , 8580 (1985). 
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cases in which the courts reached the opposite result.168 These 
courts had no problem finding the issue identity and procedural 
formality necessary for the application of collateral estoppel. In 
Osborne v. Kelly, 169 the board of review in an unemployment 
compensation case found that the employee voluntarily left work 
without good cause attributable to the employer. 110 When the 
employee filed an action for retaliatory discharge, the Illinois 
Appellate Court found that the board of review's determination 
required dismissal of the subsequent action on the basis of collat-
eral estoppel. 171 The court noted that the identical issue of whether 
plaintiff was discharged or quit was presented in both proceed-
ings.172 The plaintiff was therefore bound by the board of review's 
decision, which precluded him from establishing that he was dis-
charged, an essential element of the wrongful discharge claim. 173 
The court also found that the proceeding was sufficiently judicial 
in nature for the application of collateral estoppel, stating that 
'' [p ]rocedures for adjudicating disputed unemployment claims are 
mandated by statute and provide for judicial review. [citation 
168. Some of the cases cited in this section were decided by courts in states 
that subsequently enacted legislation barring collateral estoppel. See infra note 
315 for a list of states with legislation barring use of unemployment compensation 
decisions in later litigation. While the law in these states has changed and the 
cases are no longer viable precedent in that jurisdiction, they are useful to 
illustrate the analytical approach to this issue that permits courts to apply 
collateral estoppel in many factual situations. In states without definitive law 
precluding collateral estoppel, the analysis in these cases may well be applied. 
169. 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 565 N.E.2d 1340 (1991). 
170. Id. at 490, 565 N.E.2d at 1341. 
171. Id. at 492, 565 N.E.2d at 1343. The court refers to collateral estoppel 
as estoppel by verdict, which is distinguishable from estoppel by judgment. Id. 
172. Id.; accord Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School, 71 A.D.2d 129, 421 
N.Y.S.2d 574 (1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 415 N.E.2d 982, 434 N.Y.S.2d 994 
(1980). In Bernstein, as in Osborne, the plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract 
alleging that she was discharged. The court gave collateral estoppel effect to the 
determination by the New York State Department of Labor on her unemployment 
compensation claim that the plaintiff quit without good cause. The court found 
that the issue of voluntary termination of employment disposed of both the 
unemployment compensation claim and the wrongful discharge claim, distinguish-
ing the case from those in which the issue was misconduct. Id. at 133, 421 
N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court noted that a finding of no disqualifying misconduct 
for unemployment compensation purposes is not dispositive of the issue whether 
a discharge was proper. Id. The court did not discuss whether there was a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the unemployment proceeding, 
although it noted that factor as a requirement for application of collateral 
estoppel. Id. at 132, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 576. 
173. 207 Ill. App. 3d at 492, 565 N.E.2d at 1342-43. 
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omitted]. The administrative determination of plaintiff's claim was 
reached after a sufficiently extensive and adversarial hearing, con-
ducted under oath and on the record." 174 
The Ohio Court of Appeals, in Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care 
Services, Inc., 115 used similar analysis to uphold the application of 
collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the plaintiff's termination 
claims in a civil action. The unemployment compensation referee 
determined that the plaintiff had been discharged justifiably for 
failing to obey a written order .176 The court found that this decision 
estopped her civil action alleging age discrimination, breach of a 
contract of employment, and wrongful discharge, since the issue 
with respect to each civil cause of action (the reason for her 
discharge) would be the same as in the unemployment proceed-
ing.177 As the Illinois Appellate Court held in Osborne, the Ohio 
174. Id. at 491, 565 N.E.2d at 1342. 
175. 21 Ohio App. 3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio App. 1984). Subsequently, 
in Turk v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 1990 Ohio App. Lexis 1072 (1990), the same 
court relied on its decision in Pullar to hold that a determination by the 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review that the plaintiff voluntarily quit 
his employment precluded the plaintiff from asserting that he was fired in violation 
of his contract. The court concluded that the Pullar elements necessary to apply 
collateral estoppel were met in Turk. Id. at 18. 
176. 21 Ohio App. 3d at 289, 488 N.E.2d at 488. 
177. Id. at 292, 488 N.E.2d at 491. The court found that the conclusion 
that the discharge was based on a refusal to follow orders precluded any 
determination that her discharge was motivated by age. Id. at 291, 488 N.E.2d 
at 489. The court ignored tbe possibility, recognized by other courts, that this 
reason could have been a pretext for discrimination, or that a dual motive may 
have been operating. See Delgado, 815 F.2d at 646-47 (denying preclusive effect 
to state agency finding because of inadequate opportunity to litigate age discrim-
ination claims in unemployment compensation proceeding, noting there was no 
indication that plaintiffs had been able to present evidence of disparate treatment 
of younger employees guilty of the same offense). Such evidence could establish, 
despite the misconduct, that discrimination motivated the discharge, either solely 
or in part. The dissent in Pullar urged that since the plaintiff had no opportunity 
to argue the age discrimination issue before the unemployment referee, she should 
not be precluded from pursuing that action. 21 Ohio App. 3d at 296, 488 N.E.2d 
at 495 (Parrino, J., dissenting). Pullar's age discrimination claim was based on 
a state statute, rather than the federal ADEA, so the recent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 
111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991), would not change the result. See supra notes 38-41 and 
accompanying text. 
In Woods·v. Bulova Watch Co., 88 Lab. Cas. (CCH) , 12,045 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980), the same result was reached in a case alleging breach of contract under § 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The determination in the unem-
ployment compensation proceeding that plaintiff was discharged for insubordi-
nation, which was a proper ground for termination under the contract, collaterally 
estopped plaintiff from relitigating the issue, and the complaint was dismissed. 
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court found that procedural requirements were met, and it rejected 
plaintiff's contention that findings pursuant to a relaxed and 
abbreviated procedure such as that provided by the unemployment 
statute should not be given preclusive effect. 178 Although no tran-
script of the unemployment hearing was in the record before the 
court, the court presumed that the proceedings were regular and 
noted that plaintiff had an opportunity to produce evidence, give 
testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and appeal the decision of the 
referee. 179 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Frederick v. American 
Hardware Supply Co.180 applied collateral estoppel to bar a wrong-
ful discharge claim by employees when the Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, affirmed by the commonwealth court, 
178. 21 Ohio App. 3d at 293-94, 488 N.E.2d at 492. Plaintiff noted that 
the referee's determination could be based on evidence inadmissible in court, a 
factor that has prompted some courts to deny preclusion. See supra notes 140-
55 and accompanying text for cases in which courts have rejected preclusion 
arguments on this basis. 
179. 21 Ohio App. 3d at 294, 488 N.E.2d at 492; accord Ryan v. New York 
Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984); Burka v. 
New York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
In Ryan, the court found that an unemployment compensation decision 
finding Ryan guilty of unauthorized removal and possession of company property, 
which was misconduct sufficient to disqualify him from unemployment benefits, 
precluded his civil action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, and 
wrongful discharge. 62 N.Y.2d at 502-03, 467 N.E.2d at 491-92, 478 N.Y.S.2d 
at 827-28. The issues were identical according to the court, since the findings in 
the unemployment case would preclude Ryan from establishing the necessary 
elements of each count of his civil complaint. Further, the court found that Ryan 
litigated the issue, testified in the unemployment hearing, and cross-examined 
witnesses through his union representative. Id. at 503, 467 N.E.2d at 492, 478 
N.Y.S.2d at 828. The absence of counsel for Ryan was not determinative since 
Ryan had chosen to appear without counsel and opted to be represented by a 
demonstrably competent union representative. Id. at 504, 467 N .E.2d at 492, 478 
N.Y.S.2d at 828. 
In Burka, the court held that the finding in an unemployment compensation 
proceeding that the employee did not engage in the misconduct of drug use had 
collateral estoppel effect against the employer in a later statutory civil service 
proceeding challenging his discharge. 739 F. Supp. at 845-47. The court found 
the issues identical and noted that although the employer pursued an inexpensive 
strategy in the hearing of relying on a drug test report alone, the failure of that 
strategy did not warrant denial of collateral estoppel. The court cited the Ryan 
court's conclusion that a free choice to litigate the unemployment hearing in a 
particular way did not indicate lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue. Id. at 846. 
180. 384 Pa. Super. 72, 557 A.2d 779, appeal denied, 523 Pa. 636, 565 
A.2d 445 (1989). 
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found that the employees were discharged for willful misconduct. 
The Frederick court focused primarily on the question of whether 
the issues decided in the unemployment compensation proceeding 
and alleged in the wrongful discharge case were identical, noting 
that ''the other elements of collateral estoppel are clearly pres-
ent .... " 181 According to the court, assuming arguendo that the 
employee handbook created an implied contract, the contract 
required good cause for discharge. 182 The board of review's deter-
mination that the employees engaged in willful misconduct was a 
binding factual finding that good cause existed. 183 Accordingly, the 
doctrine of estoppel required affirmation of the trial court's order 
of summary judgment against the plaintiffs. 184 
181. Id. at 76, 557 A.2d at 781. The court cited these elements as identity 
of parties, an opportunity to litigate the issue on the merits in the unemployment 
compensation proceeding, and a final judgment in the unemployment compen-
sation proceeding. The court did not focus on the related elements of whether 
the administrative forum was judicial or whether the parties had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue. These issues may have been encompassed by the 
"opportunity to litigate the issue on the merits" element. 
182. Id. at 77-78, 557 A.2d at 781. 
183. Id. at 78, 557 A.2d at 781. 
184. Id. The Federal District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 
applying Michigan law, reached a similar result in Carlson v. Federal Express 
Corp., 107 Lab. Cas. (CCR) , 55,838 (W.D. Mich. 1987). The court found that 
a determination of misconduct under the unemployment compensation statute 
precluded a contractual claim that the discharge was not for just cause. Id. An 
employer might have just cause for discharge which does not rise to the level of 
misconduct under the unemployment statute, but rarely will a contract sanction 
conduct more egregious than misconduct under the unemployment statute. The 
implication of this conclusion is that a finding of misconduct will bar an 
employee's wrongful discharge claim, but a finding of no misconduct will not 
preclude the employer from defending such a claim on the ground that just cause 
for discharge existed. Cf. Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 189 Ill. App. 3d 450, 
545 N.E.2d 337 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 142 Ill. 2d 152, 568 N.E.2d 827 
(1990). 
The court in Carlson also found that the statutory right to a fair hearing 
on the unemployment claim, with a written decision setting forth findings of fact 
and the reasons for the decision, as well as the existence of a right to appeal 
from the decision, constituted adequate procedural protection for the application 
of collateral estoppel. 107 Lab. Cas. (CCR) , 55,838 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that collateral estoppel 
barred an employee's actions for wrongful discharge, fraud, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress based on the claim that she was forced to resign, 
sin!=e the Michigan Employment Security Commission found that she voluntarily 
quit her job. Weiler v. New Century Bank, 168 Mich. App. 354, 423 N.W.2d 
664 (1988), vacated, 431 Mich. 900, 432 N.W.2d 172 (1988). 
The cases cited above were decided before the Michigan Supreme Court's 
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Each of the preceding cases involved preclusion of wrongful 
discharge actions, 185 but courts have also barred actions alleging 
employment discrimination. In Gear v. City of Des Moines, 186 the 
plaintiff filed a civil action under Sections 1983 and 1985 alleging 
that she was harassed and discharged on the basis of her gender. 
The court dismissed her constitutional action on collateral estoppel 
grounds because the Iowa Employment Security Commission had 
found that she voluntarily left work without good cause.187 The 
decision in Storey v. Meijer, 431 Mich. 368, 429 N.W.2d 169 (1988), which held 
that, as a matter of law, unemployment compensation decisions should not be 
given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent civil litigation. The court vacated 
Weiler for reconsideration in light of Storey. See supra note 165 and accompa-
nying text. 
Contrary to the suggestion of the Michigan courts, the Federal District Court 
for the Southern District of Indiana applied collateral estoppel to bar a.n employer 
from relitigating the issue of whether there was just cause for an employee's 
discharge in the employee's action for breach of contract. Spearman v. Delco 
Remy Div. of GM Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1351 (1989). The court found that the 
issues were identical, that the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
using counsel and calling witnesses, and that the agency making the initial ruling 
had acted in a judicial capacity, since it was a decision by the Board of Review 
rather than a mere referee. Id. at 1357-59. The court distinguished the case from 
McC/anahan, 517 N.E.2d at 390, where the Indiana Supreme Court denied 
collateral estoppel because the unemployment compensation determination of the 
referee was based on an informal hearing without counsel. A substantial amount 
of hearsay had been admitted at the hearing and a potential conflict of interest 
existed. 717 F. Supp. at 1358-59. See supra notes 139, 143 and infra note 315 
for further discussion of McClanahan. 
185. Pullar involved both wrongful discharge and age discrimination claims. 
See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. 
186. 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 
187. Id. at 1224. The court relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), in which the Court held that the 
concepts of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to actions under § 1983. 
While Allen dealt with preclusion based on a prior decision by a state court, the 
Gear court found that the same principles apply in administrative adjudication. 
514 F. Supp. at 1220. 
In Stall v. Bourne, 774 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1985), withdrawn by an equally 
divided court, 783 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying South Carolina law, held that a 
constitutional claim based on the first amendment was precluded by an unem-
ployment compensation determination that the employee was discharged for 
misconduct connected with work. In affirming the district court's entry of 
summary judgment against the plaintiff on collateral estoppel grounds, the court 
stated: 
[T]he reasons for Stall's discharge were fully and fairly presented and 
litigated in an adjudicatory proceeding before the Commission and before 
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Gear court articulated in detail the factors to be considered in 
determining whether to apply collateral estoppel. The court also 
noted that "collateral estoppel should be employed more selectively 
and with a greater degree of flexibility when an administrative 
finding is involved. " 188 The Gear court found that the agency 
process was adjudicative because it employed notice, subpoena 
power, discovery, evidentiary rules, and presentation of evidence 
and argument, including examination and cross-examination, in 
addition to including a provision for judicial review. 189 Although 
the plaintiff did not employ counsel, the court found that she 
introduced witness testimony and "capably prosecuted her claim 
for benefits." 190 The court rejected the contention that the plaintiff 
did not have adequate incentive to litigate the issue, relying on the 
narrow scope of judicial review afforded to administrative agency 
decisions under Iowa law .191 Further, the court found sufficient 
identity of issues, noting that "material facts actually or necessarily 
adjudicated in the agency hearing form the sole predicate for 
plaintiff's constitutional challenge .... " 192 
the state court on the record made in the Commission proceedings in 
the context of Stall's unemployment benefits claim. Stall had a full and 
fair opportunity to present his constitutional contentions in an adjudi-
catory hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction, vested with the 
duty to hear and resolve questions appearing in the case before it. 
774 F.2d at 661. As noted, on rehearing en bane, an equally divided court 
affirmed the decision, but withdrew the panel opinion. 783 F.2d at 476. 
188. 514 F. Supp. at 1221. 
189. Although there was no statutory bar to the admission of hearsay, the 
court did not deem this factor sufficient to outweigh the numerous other pro-
cedural similarities to the judicial process. Id. Gear did not seek judicial review 
of the agency's decision denying unemployment compensation, but the court 
found the opportunity for judicial review sufficient to apply collateral estoppel. 
Id. at 1220-21. 
190. Id. at 1221. 
191. Id. at 1222. The court did not specifically address the argument, 
accepted by many courts denying collateral estoppel, that the difference in the 
amounts in controversy limited the incentive to litigate. See supra notes 131-39 
and accompanying text. The court noted that the limited scope of judicial review 
of administrative agency actions made the ramifications of the adjudication 
foreseeable and provided an incentive to litigate. 514 F. Supp. at 1222. However, 
the court did not specifically address the foreseeability of preclusion. See supra 
note 137 and accompanying text. 
192. 514 F. Supp. at 1223. 
Conclusions that plaintiff's work schedule had not been revised without 
notice, thus justifying her failure to report for duty were implicit in the 
department hearing officer's adverse findings in the record as to Lieu-
1992] PRECLUSIVE EFFECT 1843 
Similarly, in Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission, 193 the court found the Employ-
ment Security Commission's determination that the plaintiff 
voluntarily left work without good cause to attend a religious 
convocation collaterally estopped the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission (FEPC) from deciding whether she was discriminated 
against on the basis of her religion. 194 The issues were identical, 
according to the court, which reversed the FEPC's decision in 
Id. 
tenant Gillespie's sexual harassment of the plaintiff, the allegedly wrong-
ful withholding of a final paycheck, the necessity of requesting permission 
of male superiors to use the restroom, and the circumstances of her 
unexcused absences on the 27th, 28th and 29th days of October. As the 
hearing officer found these acts did not occur, Chief Nichols could not 
have fostered an environment which contributed to such alleged acts of 
individual sexual discrimination. 
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reached a 
similar result in an age discrimination claim in Rotert v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 623 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Conn. 1985). In this case, the employee was 
precluded from asserting in her age discrimination suit that she was constructively 
discharged, because she was denied unemployment compensation on the basis 
that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. The issue of whether 
her working conditions were so intolerable that she had no choice but to resign 
was disposed of by the Employment Security Board of Review and the superior 
court on review of that decision, collaterally estopping relitigation. Id. at 1118. 
The court noted that the plaintiff was represented by counsel and had an 
opportunity to call witnesses, introduce evidence, and make legal argument in 
the unemployment hearing. Id. Further, the court noted that consideration of 
the issue of constructive discharge was a necessary element of the unemployment 
proceeding. Id. at 1118-19. 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland relied on Gear 
to hold that a determination in an unemployment compensation proceeding that 
· the plaintiff's discharge was based on misconduct, not sex discrimination or 
retaliation for complaints to OSHA, barred relitigation of the sex discrimination 
and retaliation claims in his Title VII action. Ross v. Communications Satellite 
Corp., 34 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 260, 264 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd, 159 F.2d 355 
(4th Cir. 1985). The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Ross also negates the 
decision of the same district court in Harding v. Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 599 
F. Supp. 180 (D. Md. 1984), which accorded collateral estoppel effect to the 
decision of the Maryland Employment Security Administration on an unemploy-
ment compensation claim to bar litigation in a subsequent race discrimination 
action. The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Ross relied upon analogous Maryland 
law to determine how Maryland courts would decide the collateral estoppel issue. 
759 F.2d at 361-62. The Maryland state courts could decide the issue differently, 
however. 
193. 598 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1979). 
194. Id. 
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favor of the plaintiff .195 The court emphasized the importance of 
the policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating: 
In our society, which is witnessing such increases in the 
field of activity of administrative bodies and the prolifer-
ation of their actions, the protection of citizens from being 
harassed and vexed by repeated hearings on the same matter 
is of monumental importance. It may not be amiss to note 
the entirely human instinct that governs the operation of 
such administrative bodies, and that they when exposed to 
the temptation to do so, have difficulty resisting opportu-
nity to enhance their power and importance by assertions 
of jurisdiction in matters already in the hands of some 
other competent administrative body .196 
In none of these cases were the courts persuaded that the 
different statutory focus of unemployment compensation and dis-
crimination laws prevented the plaintiff from having a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the discrimination claim in the unem-
ployment forum. 197 In Hill v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 198 the court 
did permit relitigation of the discrimination issue in the civil suit, 
but precluded the plaintiff from relitigating the factual issue of 
whether he violated company policy on the basis of the determi-
nation in the unemployment compensation proceeding. 199 Accord-
195. Id. at 439-40. The court relied on the analogous decision of the Colorado 
Court of Appeals in Colorado Springs Coach Co. v. State Civil Rights Comm'n, 
35 Colo. App. 378, 536 P.2d 837 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976). In 
that case, the court barred plaintiff's race discrimination action brought before 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, based on a decision in the unemployment 
compensation case that the plaintiff was discharged for his failure to make 
scheduled bus runs, not for his race. Both the Colorado and Wyoming legislatures 
subsequently enacted statutory prohibitions on according collateral estoppel effect 
to unemployment compensation decisions. See infra note 315. 
196. 598 P .2d at 440 (emphasis added). 
197. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
198. 786 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1986). 
199. Id. at 553. In Knox v. Cornell Univ., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
433 (1982), the United States District Court for the Northern District of New 
York applied New York law, as did the Hill court, but reached a different result 
on the preclusion issue. The Knox court held that the plaintiff was precluded 
altogether from relitigating the termination issue in his race discrimination case, 
based on the decision by the State Department of Labor that he was discharged 
for misconduct. 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 435-36. Unlike Hill, Knox 
did not have the opportunity to prove that, but for his race, he would not have 
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ingly, in order to prevail on the discrimination claim, the plaintiff 
had to prove that, but for his race, he would not have been 
discharged for the misconduct. 200 
The previous cases demonstrate the various judicial approaches 
to the doctrine of preclusion and provide a basis for analysis of 
whether such preclusion is appropriate in the context of unem-
ployment compensation decisions. 
been terminated. 
In Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417, 1420-21 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 760 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985), the court 
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the Secretary of Labor in a 
proceeding under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The court 
found that the Secretary's action sought to benefit the employee, who had been 
denied unemployment benefits because he was discharged for walking off the 
job. Accordingly, the decision regarding the reason for his termination was 
binding on the Secretary. Because the administrative agency's decision did not 
state that walking off the job was the sole reason for the discharge, however, 
the Secretary could still attempt to prove that discrimination was a motivating 
factor in the termination. As in Hill, the collateral estoppel finding did not 
dispose of the discrimination action. The court in Donovan also declined to give 
collateral estoppel effect to the administrative agency's findings that the employer 
was aware of the employee's complaint of a health hazard prior to terminating 
him. 587 F.Supp. at 1422. The court relied on several factors to deny estoppel: 
the fact that the agency's decision on this issue was not appealed to the court 
since the employee was denied unemployment compensation benefits, the sup-
position that the agency may have imposed a more stringent burden of proof 
than preponderance of the evidence with respect to that issue because it dealt 
with the culpability of the employee rather than the employer, and the fact that 
the agency held the first day of hearings in the absence of tlie employer's counsel 
despite the counsel's request for a postponement. Id. at 1422-23. 
200. 786 F.2d at 553-54. The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
two different types of disparate treatment cases under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act when the employer has asserted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employee's discharge: the dual motive and the pretext case. In a dual 
motive case, where the employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate 
considerations, if the employee proves that discrimination was a substantial 
motivating factor, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the employee 
would have been discharged even in the absence of the discriminatory motive. 
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). In a pretext case, 
the plaintiff must show that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
dismissal articulated by the employer is a pretext for discrimination. See Texas 
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981). Note that § 
107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 legislatively overruled Hopkins. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(e)-2(m). The employer's proof that the employee would have been dis-
charged even absent the discriminatory motive does not defeat the employee's 
claim but limits the remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(g)(l2)(B). 
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Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL ON THE 
BASIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DECISIONS 
The judicial decisions discussed above provide arguments for 
and against the use of collateral estoppel based on unemployment 
compensation decisions. These arguments will be analyzed in light 
of the policies underlying both collateral estoppel and unemploy-
ment compensation. 
The cases analyzed demonstrate three primary arguments against 
application of collateral estoppel based on unemployment compen-
sation decisions: first, the requisite issue identity between the two 
proceedings may not be present; second, unemployment compen-
sation proceedings do not provide a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the discharge issue;201 and third, the application of collateral 
estoppel will have adverse consequences on the unemployment 
compensation system, interfering with the public policies underlying 
unemployment compensation statutes. Each of these arguments 
will be examined in turn, along with the counter-arguments of 
proponents of collateral estoppel. 
A. The Absence of Issue Identity 
The first requirement that may determine the use of collateral 
estoppel in the unemployment context is issue identity. Unless the 
issue is the same in both proceedings, the party against whom 
preclusi01it is sought to be applied is entitled to litigate in the 
second proceeding because the litigation is not repetitious. 202 Courts 
in many cases have found that the requisite issue identity was not 
present.203 Nevertheless, there are other cases where courts have 
properly concluded that issue identity exists. This suggests that the 
201. The absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate encompasses a 
number of different factors. See supra notes 125-55 and accompanying text. 
202. If the issues are not identical, then a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue in the second action did not exist in the original action. Comment, 
supra note 10, at 824. The traditional requirements of collateral estoppel also 
specify that the issue determined in the initial proceeding must have been essential 
to the judgment. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Cases treating 
collateral estoppel in the unemployment compensation context have not relied on 
this factor to deny collateral estoppel. However, it has been argued that if the 
unemployment compensation determination made findings not essential to the 
judgment, collateral estoppel should be denied. See Committee on Benefits of 
Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 78-79. This argument does not support a 
complete ban on collateral estoppel, but supports the ,conclusion that its appli-
cability in the unemployment compensation context is limited. 
203. See cases cited supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text. 
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problem of issue identity does not require a complete ban on 
collateral estoppel. For example, in Osborne v. Kelly,204 the court 
concluded that the determination in the unemployment proceeding 
that the employee voluntarily quit barred his action for retaliatory 
discharge. 205 
By way of contrast, in an employment discrimination case 
where motive for discharge is an essential element of the claim, 
the determination of whether an employee was discharged for 
misconduct is not identical to the issue of whether discrimination 
caused the discharge. While the issues may first appear identical, 
the determination in an employment discrimination case requires 
a careful analysis of the employer's motive, even if it is established 
that the employee engaged in misconduct.206 The agencies and 
proceedings designed for quick determinations of eligibility for 
unemployment compensation benefits are ill-suited to make so-
phisticated and necessary determinations of motive in employment 
discrimination cases, even when the issue is raised.207 The same is 
true when the issue is one of discriminatory constructive discharge. 
While it may appear that issues of voluntarily quiting without 
good cause under unemployment law and constructive discharge 
are the same, 208 complex issues of discrimination need to be ana-
lyzed by a proper and experienced forum. 209 In addition, similar 
issues of motivation will be relevant in any case alleging wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. 210 
204. 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 565 N.E.2d 1340, appeal denied, 137 Ill. 2d 666, 
571 N.E.2d 150 (1991). 
205. Id. at 492, 565 N.E.2d at 1342-43. See supra notes 169-74 and accom-
panying text. However, preclusion would not be appropriate under these circum-
stances if the employee alleged a discriminatory constructive discharge where 
motive was at issue. See infra notes 207-11 and accompanying text. 
206. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 646-47 
(11th Cir.), reh'g denied en bane, 820 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1987), in which the 
court refused to preclude relitigation of an age discrimination claim because, 
even though the unempJoyment compensation agency found that the employees 
engaged in misconduct, it failed to hear and consider evidence that younger 
employees who engaged in the same conduct were treated differently than the 
plaintiffs. 
207. See Silver, supra note 29, at 416-17. 
208. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
209. See Silver, supra note 29, at 417; see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (courts in Title VII actions not required to defer to 
arbitrator's decisions because arbitrator chosen for expertise in industrial relations 
and contract interpretation, not in public law). 
210. See Willoughby v. Gencorp, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), 
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The issues are more likely to be identical in discharge cases 
involving questions of whether an employee was discharged for 
just cause. If an employee engaged in sufficient misconduct to 
disqualify the employee for unemployment compensation benefits, 
just cause for termination likely existed. 211 This is because the test 
for misconduct is generally more stringent than that for just 
cause. 212 The reverse is not true, however. A finding of no mis-
where the court found that although the unemployment hearing officer found 
that the employer had a legitimate basis for terminating the plaintiff, a jury 
could determine that the reason for termination was a pretext and the plaintiff 
was discharged wrongfully in violation of public policy. The issue of breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a similar analysis of the 
employer's motivation that is not required in an unemployment compensation 
proceeding. See Niles v. Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc., 241 Mont. 230, 786 P.2d 
662 (1990). 
211. The court should take care to insure that the issues are identical because 
there may be circumstances other than the nature of the misconduct that warrant 
a determination of no just cause or breach of contract. For example, if the 
contract requires that the employer follow progressive discipline and the employer 
failed to do so, the employee may prevail even if the employee committed 
misconduct. See Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 
1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) ("If the court or jury concludes 
that the [employment] manual's job security provisions are binding, then, ac-
cording to those provisions, even if good cause existed, an employee could not 
be fired unless the employer went through the various procedures set forth in 
the manual, steps designed to rehabilitate that employee in order to avoid 
termination."); Shields & Terrell Convalescent Hosp., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 884, 
887 (1971) (Statement by David G. Heilbrun, arbitrator). (Although the employee 
"was unequivocally instructed to perform certain duties and failed to do so 
without reasonable excuse," and the contract allowed the employer to discharge 
employees for insubordination and failure to perform work as required, the 
arbitrator reduced the discharge to a suspension because the employer failed to 
follow progressive discipline.) 
212. As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Jackson v. Board of Review, 
105 Ill. 2d 501, 507, 475 N.E.2d 879, 882-83 (1985), "every justifiable discharge 
does not disqualify the discharged employee from receiving [un]employment 
benefits under the Act." In order to be disqualified for benefits, state statutes 
generally require gross misconduct or deliberate and willful misconduct. See supra 
note 76; Saucier & Roberts, supra note 4, at 599. Gross misconduct requires 
intentional misconduct or gross indifference to the employer's interests. See 
Delgado v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 788, 116 Cal. 
Rptr. 497 (1974), where the court noted that while the employee violated a 
company rule requiring employees to ring up sales as the money was received, 
she was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because she acted to 
please customers rather than with malice toward the employer; Morgen v. CBS, 
Inc., 54 A.D.2d 523, 524, 386 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (1976), where the court refused 
to preclude an unemployment compensation hearing on the issue of misconduct 
on the basis that an arbitrator had held that just cause for discharge existed, 
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conduct does not negate a finding of just cause213 unless the 
unemployment board determines that the employee did not commit 
the act of which she was accused. This conclusion suggests that 
in some circumstances, preclusion might be more appropriately 
applied to bar an employee from relitigating the issue of cause 
than to bar an employer. 
In some cases, collateral estoppel could be applied to bar either 
party from relitigating the issue. When the unemployment agency 
decides· the question of whether the employee engaged in the 
conduct alleged to have prompted the discharge, courts can use 
the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Hill v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co.214 to limit the issues that require litigation in the 
second action. In Hill, the employer attempted to use the unem-
ployment board's finding-that the employee was discharged for 
misconduct-as a basis for barring the employee's race discrimi-
nation claim. The court rejected the argument, but precluded 
relitigation on the issue of whether the employee engaged in 
misconduct. 215 The court recognized that the complex and sensitive 
issues involved in the race discrimination claim were not adequately 
litigated in the previous unemployment proceeding. 216 Nevertheless, 
because the issues of just cause and misconduct were not identical; Fiscarelli v. 
Ross, 65 A.D.2d 855, 856, 410 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1978) where the court stated 
that "[i]nefficiency, negligence and bad judgment are valid causes for discharge 
but do not render a claimant ineligible for benefits." Some states, however, 
employ a lesser standard for misconduct. See supra note 76. 
For a discussion of issue preclusion in suits under § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act and unemployment compensation determinations, see 
Issue Preclusion: Unemployment Compensation Determinations and Section 301 
Suits, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 862 (1981). The author discusses the question 
of whether misconduct under the unemployment statute and just cause for 
discharge under a collective bargaining agreement are identical issues. The author 
concludes that the answer depends on the state's interpretation of the unemploy-
ment statute. Id. at 881. 
213. See Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 189 Ill. App. 3d 450, 545 N.E.2d 
337 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 142 Ill. 2d 152, 568 N.E.2d 827 (1990) 
(misconduct under unemployment statute defined as "deliberate and willful 
violation of a reasonable rule or policy," while just cause under employment 
manual did not require deliberate and willful misconduct). Accordingly, the Board 
of Review's conclusion that the employee was not discharged for misconduct did 
not bind the employer in the breach of contract action. See supra notes 113-18 
and accompanying text. 
214. 786 F.2d 550 (1986). 
215. Id. at 553. 
216. Id. The same is true of other actions in which employer motive is a 
key issue. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text. 
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even in a discrimination action, some issues may be adequately 
litigated before the unemployment agency, therefore barring reli-
tigation. 217 It is crucial for courts considering the application of 
collateral estoppel to scrutinize carefully claims of issue identity. 
The courts must look beyond appearances to insure that, in fact, 
all key elements of the issues are identical.218 
Thus, issue identity problems alone do not render collateral 
estoppel inappropriate to all unemployment compensation deter-
minations. While the number of cases where the requisite issue 
identity exists may not be extensive, courts can apply collateral 
estoppel in appropriate circumstances to prevent unnecessary reU-
tigation of some issues and achieve some of the benefits of 
collateral estoppel. 2 19 
B. A Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate Discharge Issues 
The second argument for denying issue preclusion to unem-
ployment determinations is that the proceedings do not provide a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate issues arising in later termi-
nation actions. There are a number of elements of this argument, 
including: 1) the issue in a discharge suit may not be fully explored 
in an unemployment proceeding;220 2) there is insufficient incentive 
to litigate in an unemployment proceeding where the amount at 
stake is much smaller than in a later lawsuit;221 3) the parties may 
not adequately litigate the issues because they frequently do not 
use attorneys in unemployment proceedings;222 4) the full panoply 
of procedural protections available in a lawsuit is not available in 
an unemployment hearing;223 and 5) the burdens of proof in an 
unemployment proceeding differ from the burdens in a lawsuit. 224 
217. Preclusion would be appropriate only if all other requirements for 
application of collateral estoppel are met, of course. 
218. Courts should not assume that because an unemployment proceeding 
litigates the issue of discharge for misconduct that any later lawsuit challenging 
the discharge raises an identical issue. 
219. Because of the need for careful and sensitive inquiry into the issue 
identity question, it might be argued that the risk of error by a court is so great 
that preclusion ought to be barred. Judicial error is a risk inherent in litigation, 
however, and the number of cases in which a court has reached an inappropriate 
decision regarding issue preclusion based on unemployment proceedings is not so 
large that preclusion should be outlawed on the basis of potential error. 
220. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. 
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This section examines these arguments to determine whether they 
warrant a ban on collateral estoppel based on unemployment 
compensation findings. 
First, the failure to explore the issues fully certainly warrants 
denial of collateral estoppel in the particular case, 225 but it does 
not support a blanket denial of collateral estoppel. For example, 
it is conceivable that the issue of whether the employee quit or 
was discharged could be fully explored in an unemployment pro-
ceeding. In such a case, collateral estoppel could be appropriately 
applied. 226 
The necessity for an adequate incentive to litigate is more 
troublesome, however. Rarely will the amount at stake in an 
unemployment proceeding approach the amount at stake in any 
later discharge litigation. In December 1988, unemployed workers 
averaged $145.00 per week in benefits for an average of 13.9 
weeks.227 The maximum duration of benefits in most states is 
twenty-six weeks, 228 except in the rare circumstance when extended 
benefits are available due to a high unemployment rate.229 For 
225. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. 
227. Unemployment Insurance, supra note 4, at 22. "The typical claimant 
may only collect $1,600 during his or her period of unemployment." Unemploy-
ment Boards' Statement, supra note 105, at 208. See supra notes 133-36 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of the amount of benefits at stake in 
an unemployment proceeding. 
228. Unemployment Insurance, supra note 4, at 23-24. 
229. Because of changes in the law, the extended benefit program rarely 
applies even in states with troubled economies and high unemployment rates. 
Rejda & Lee, supra note 136, at 656-57; Shapiro, Uncovered: Unemployment 
and Jobless Workers in 1987 11-12 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 
1988). In 1990, in the midst of the recession, only two states qualified for 
extended benefits. Shapiro & Nichols, Unemployed and Uninsured 23 (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities 1991). As of mid-1991, as the recession continued, 
only five states qualified for the extended benefits program. Id. at 23-24. In late 
1991, Congress finally enacted legislation providing for extended benefits on an 
emergency basis and President Bush signed the bill. 137 CoNG. REc. 01451 (Nov. 
18, 1991) (P.L. 102-164). As the recession continued, Congress again enacted to 
extend benefits in February 1992. 138 CONG. REC. 0109 (Feb. 18, 1992) (P .L. 
102-244). On July 3, 1992, President Bush signed H.R. 260, now Public Law 
102-318, which extended the emergency unemployment compensation program to 
March 6, 1993. 138 CONG. REc. 0860 (July 7, 1992). The Bill amends the Federal-
State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 to give states the 
option to choose a trigger for extended benefit qualification that would make it 
easier for unemployed workers in the state to qualify for extended benefits. 
Benefits Extension Passes with Bipartisan Support, 10 Lab. Rel. Rep. 337, 338-
39 (July 13, 1992). 
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employers, even less is at stake. At most, the employer faces a 
future increase in its unemployment insurance rate if the employee 
prevails on a benefits claim.230 
The amount at stake in discharge litigation, on the other hand, 
whether wrongful discharge or employment discrimination, for 
significant can often be quite. Under Title VII and the ADEA, an 
unlawfully discharged employee is entitled to reinstatement and 
back pay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added limited com-
pensatory and punitive damages to Title VII remedies. 231 Under 
Section 1981, the court can award the employee compensatory and 
punitive damages.232 A successful breach of contract action gen-
erally will provide back pay, 233 as will an action for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 234 A tort action for 
230. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a). Title VII 
remedies include reinstatement with or without back pay and limited compensatory 
and punitive damages. The ADEA also provides for liquidated damages that 
double the amount of back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (incorporating 
liquidated damages provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
216(c) (1988)). 
A study of employment discrimination decisions in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the period 1972 to 1986 revealed 
that the average award in published cases was $606,424, while the average award 
in unpublished cases was $12,545. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 1, at 1151. 
232. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). 
Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the courts of appeals split 
on whether§ 1981, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Patterson 
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), prohibits discharge based on race, 
however. See, e.g., Hicks v. Brown Group, 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g 
denied en bane, 1990 vacated sub. nom., Brown Group, Inc. v. Hicks, 111 S. 
Ct. 1299 (1991) (Section 1981 encompasses retaliatory discharge). Compare Overby 
v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1989) (allegations of retaliatory 
discharge do not state claim under§ 1981). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended 
§ 1981 to clarify that discharge is prohibited by the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1981(b). Unlike Title VII, § 1981 contains no statutory limitations on compen-
satory and punitive damages. 
233. Contract theory generally provides for "make whole" damages. M. 
ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 875 (2d ed. 1990). Some 
courts have awarded mental distress damages in a contract action. Id. at 875-76 
(citing Mosely v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. 
(BNA) 1744 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). 
234. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 
1251 (1977) (court upheld award of commissions to employee that he would have 
earned had he not been terminated to avoid payment of commissions). In Foley 
v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 
(1988), the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounded in contract and not in 
tort, thereby limiting the employee to contract damages. 
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wrongful discharge in violation of public policy has potential for 
both compensatory and punitive damages. 235 While the discharged 
employee has the obligation to mitigate damages, and interim 
earnings will be deducted from back pay,236 unless the employee 
finds equally remunerative employment almost immediately, the 
discharge action will be worth significantly more than the unem-
ployment action. Thus, since unemployment compensation is de-
signed to compensate the employee for about fifty percent of the 
usual earnings, and frequently falls below that amount, 237 the 
employee in the discharge action has the potential to recover at 
least double the amount of unemployment compensation for the 
first six months and full back pay after that. In most actions, the 
employee's potential recovery will be far greater. For the employer, 
the disparity between the amounts at stake in the two proceedings 
will be even wider.23s 
While this disparity suggests that application of collateral es-
toppel would be inappropriate under any circumstance, a careful 
inquiry by the court to insure that the parties fully litigated the 
issue could result in the conclusion that preclusion is appropriate. 
The possibility of preclusion provides an incentive to litigate thor-
oughly. 239 Because the unemployment hearing takes place almost 
235. See M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 858-59 
(noting that awards of several hundred thousand dollars are not uncommon and 
in some cases awards have exceeded a million dollars). A Rand Corporation 
study of 120 wrongful discharge cases in California that went to verdict revealed 
an average award for victorious plaintiffs of $646,855. J. DERTouzos, E. HOLLAND 
& P. EBENER, supra note 1, at 25. The average punitive damages award was 
$523,170. Id. 
236. -Title VII expressly provides for deduction of interim earnings or amounts 
earnable with reasonable diligence by the discriminatee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) 
(1988). Deduction of amounts earnable by reasonable diligence is a rule of 
damages under traditional contract law, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 
Title VII, and the ADEA. However, the burden of proving what the plaintiff 
could have earned is on the defendant. See B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1447 (2d ed. 1983). See also M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP 
& L. LIEBMAN, supra note 1, at 876 ("contractual remedy theory requires 
mitigation of damages by the plaintiffs"). 
237. See Unemployment Insurance, supra note 4, at 22, 25. 
238. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
239. See Committee on Benefits to Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 
80; Mazurak, supra note 6, at 168 n.136. Mazurak suggests that applying collateral 
estoppel based on unemployment proceedings will improve the quality of those 
proceedings. Id. This argument ignores the cost of such improvements to the 
employers and employees. See infra notes 262-314 and accompanying text. Courts 
faced with collateral estoppel issues should consider that factors such as failure 
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immediately after discharge, however, the parties may be unaware 
of the possibility of a later lawsuit over the discharge.240 Further-
more, if aware of the possibility, the employer might be encouraged 
to litigate every unemployment compensation claim as if a later 
lawsuit would be filed, 241 although in most cases no later litigation 
would result. The possibility of preclusion also would encourage 
the employee to consult and retain an attorney immediately, if 
possible.242 
Even where the incentive to litigate is present, an unemploy-
ment proceeding is not identical to a judicial proceeding, and the 
differences may make preclusion inappropriate. All state un~m­
ployment statutes contain procedural due process requirements,243 
but reliance on the statutory provisions alone is not sufficient to 
insure an adequate opportunity to litigate. 244 The hearings are 
informal and the rules of evidence and procedure need not be 
followed. 245 Hearsay is admissible and a decision may be supported 
by, or even based on, hearsay. 246 The parties frequently are not 
to employ counsel, failure to appear for any part of the unemployment compen-
sation hearing, and failure to take advantage of the right to appeal suggest that 
the incentive to litigate was not present. See Lewis, 393 F. Supp. at 308-09. 
240. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 209-10. 
241. This approach creates problems for the unemployment compensation 
system. See infra notes 279-314 and accompanying text. 
242. Employees may be significantly disadvantaged if collateral estoppel is 
applied, however, due to the difficulty they have in obtaining representation. See 
infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text. 
243. The federal Social Security Act requires that each state's unemployment 
law provide an opportunity for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal for a 
claimant whose benefits are denied. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1988). In addition, 
most state unemployment statutes have fair hearing requirements. McHugh, The 
"Fair Hearing" Concept in Unemployment Insurance Cases, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REv. 892, 893 (1984). 
244. Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 457-58, notes that some courts hold 
that an opportunity to litigate is sufficient, applying collateral estoppel even when 
an issue is not actually litigated in the first action. Perschbacher found this 
approach to be particularly prevalent when courts were reviewing administrative 
determinations for possible application of collateral estoppel. Id. Proper appli-
cation of collateral estoppel in this context requires actual litigation of the issue, 
however. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
245. See 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 2020: 
The attempt has been made . . . to simplify procedure so that the 
employee may be able to prosecute his [or her] claim without the expense 
of obtaining legal counsel. Many states provide that the common law 
or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure 
need not be applied. 
See also infra note 271 (information regarding the brief length of most hearings). 
246. See Clapper, 437 N.W.2d at 726. 
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represented by attorneys,247 and thus the litigation, particularly 
cross-examination, may be ineffective to insure adequate explora-
tion of the issues. 248 Many state unemployment agencies use tele-
phone hearings as a cost-saving device.249 The use of telephone 
hearings can create problems in evaluating the credibility of wit-
nesses, difficulties in conducting effective cross-examination, and 
complications in introducing documents and questioning witnesses 
about the documents.250 
Additional procedural differences between unemployment com-
pensation proceedings and discharge litigation include the unavail-
ability of discovery in the former, and the lack of preparation 
time for unemployment hearings because of the speed of claims 
processing. 251 Finally, the burdens of proof may differ in the two 
proceedings.252 These procedural differences limit the cases in which 
collateral estoppel should be applied to preclude discharge litigation 
based on unemployment proceedings. 
The elements necessary for application of collateral estoppel 
have not been met unless the issue before the court was fairly and 
adequately litigated in a proceeding with either procedural protec-
tions similar to those available in court or differences that could 
not lead to a different result in the judicial action. For example, 
denial of preclusion is warranted when credibility of witnesses is 
relevant and the unemployment compensation proceeding use a 
telephone hearing253 or when the effectiveness of cross examination 
247. See McHugh, Lay Representation in Unemployment Insurance Hearings: 
Some Strategies for Change, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 865, 866 nn.8-9 (1983) 
(1979 study by National Commission on Unemployment Compensation found 
only 7.230/o of claimants represented, and only 650/o of claimants' representatives 
lawyers); N.Y. Bar Committee Report, supra note 136, at 742-43 (same survey 
found only 9% of employers represented by counsel). 
248. See Mcclanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 395. 
249. See McHugh & Ferrazza, Telephone Hearings as Unemployment Fair 
Hearings, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 33 (1985); Note, Telephonic Hearings in 
Welfare Appeals: How Much Process is Due?, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 445, 445-
46 (1984); Fetherston v. ASARCO, 635 F. Supp. at 1446; Niles v. Carl Weissman 
& Sons, Inc., 241 Mont. at 235, 786 P.2d at 666. 
250. See McHugh & Ferrazza, supra note 249, at 33-34; Note, supra note 
249, at 468-69, 473 (author argues that telephone hearings do not comply with 
requirements of due process). 
251. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. 
253. Some courts in unemployment compensation appeals have indicated 
skepticism regarding whether telephone hearings afford- due process. See, e.g., 
Asche v. Industrial Comm'n, 654 P.2d 813, 814 (Colo. 1982) (court reversed 
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at the hearing is limited by the absence of counsel or competent 
lay representation.254 Similarly, preclusion should be denied when 
a party is hampered by the absence of discovery. 255 When the 
decision is based wholly or partly on evidence that is inadmissible 
in court, preclusion should be denied. Also, preclusion should not 
apply when different burdens of proof exist that might change the 
outcome in the second proceeding. 
Careful judicial review of the unemployment compensation 
proceeding and the decision of the referee or board is essential to 
insure that procedural differences between the unemployment hear-
ing and the judicial action could not lead to a different result in 
the latter proceeding.256 Such a review will insure that collateral 
estoppel serves its purpose without unfairly prejudicing either the 
employer or the employee in subsequent litigation. 257 This careful 
review necessarily limits the benefits of collateral estoppel; it 
lower court's dismissal of appeal challenging fairness of telephone hearing, 
indicating that agency had burden to show that such hearing was valid and 
proper procedure); Weir v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. 
of Review, 88 Pa. Commw. 372, 489 A.2d 979, 980 (1985) (referee's call to 
employer witness not present at hearing for corroborating testimony unfair to 
claimant); Chobi;rt v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
view, 86 Pa. Commw. 151, 154-55, 484 A.2d 223, 225 (1984) (unfair for employer 
to testify over the telephone from documents unavailable to the claimant). 
254. Statistical evidence suggests that representation increases a claimant's 
chance of obtaining unemployment compensation benefits. McHugh, supra note 
247, at 866. Due to limitations on fees and inability of claimants to pay attorneys, 
representation of claimants by attorneys is unlikely to occur in most cases, but 
lay representation by legal services paralegals, law students, and union officials 
can be effective. Id. Employers also frequently rely on lay representation when 
permissible. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
255. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979), in 
which the Supreme Court permitted use of issue preclusion by the plaintiffs who 
were neither parties nor privies to the earlier adjudication, the Court was careful 
to note that issue preclusion should rarely be applied if the second forum provides 
procedural opportunities unavailable in the first forum, such as discovery or 
evidentiary rules, that could change the outcome. 
256. See Comment, supra note 10, at 843, 846 (argues that courts should 
require a high degree of formality in agency proceedings before applying collateral 
estoppel based on any administrative determination). 
257. The requirement. of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
incorporates the concept of fairness to litigants. See Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite 
of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make An Admin-
istrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 63, 84-85 (1986); Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Servs. Inc., 21 Ohio App. 
3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984) (court failed to conduct appropriate inquiry for 
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reduces judicial economy by requiring the court to devote more 
resources to review the administrative proceeding. Nevertheless, as 
long as courts carefully consider the application of collateral 
estoppel and limit its use to situations where procedural differences 
could not cause a different outcome in the discharge hearing, the 
procedural differences do not justify outlawing collateral estoppel 
based on unemployment decisions. 
Of the arguments against application of collateral estoppel 
discussed thus far, none warrants a complete ban, but each suggests 
that the use of collateral estoppel based on unemployment com-
pensation decisions will be limited. Further, because of the close 
judicial scrutiny required when collateral estoppel is urged, the 
doctrine will not significantly serve the goal of judicial economy. 
In addition, as employers and employees become more aware of 
the possibility that collateral estoppel may be applied on the basis 
of the unemployment compensation determination, they will devote 
more resources to the unemployment hearing if possible. This 
maneuvering could cause longer and more complex hearings and 
greater incentive to appeal, further reducing judicial economy and 
resulting in little savings for the parties.258 This point relates directly 
to the final and most persuasive argument against applying collat-
eral estoppel in the unemployment context-the potential adverse 
impact on the unemployment compensation system. 
C. The Impact of Collateral Estoppel on the Unemployment 
Compensation System 
Each of the arguments discussed earlier leaves room for the 
application of preclusion in appropriate cases. The uncertainty 
created by leaving the issue for the courts to resolve on a case by 
case basis, however, results in serious problems for the adminis-
tration of the unemployment compensation system. If the possi-
application of collateral estoppel). The Pullar court presumed that the unem-
ployment proceedings were regular despite the absence of a transcript of the 
unemployment hearing. Id. at 294, 488 N.E.2d at 492. Further, the court noted 
that plaintiff had an opportunity to present evidence, give testimony, cross-
examine witnesses, and appeal the administrator's decision to the board of review 
referee. Id. The decision did not indicate that plaintiff effectively took advantage 
of the opportunity, which would show that she had both adequate incentive to 
litigate and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues. The court also failed 
to note the difference between the issue in the unemployment compensation 
proceeding and the age discrimination action. 
258. See Comment, supra note 10, at 838-39. 
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bility of preclusion of later litigation exists, sophisticated parties 
will attempt to litigate fully in the unemployment proceeding the 
issues that might arise in a subsequent lawsuit. 259 Unemployment 
hearings will not only litigate entitlement to benefits, but also the 
more complex issues of discriminatory discharge and wrongful 
discharge. For example, an employer will not only attempt to 
prove that an employee committed misconduct sufficient for dis-
qualification from benefits, but also will of fer evidence designed 
to establish that the discharge was actually motivated by the 
misconduct and not by any illegal reason, 260 in whole or in part. 
The employer will try to prove that it harbored no hostility based 
on the employee's race, gender, religion, or other relevant status 
and that it engaged in no disparate treatment of the employee. 
The employer also will attempt to show that the employee conduct 
constituted just cause for termination under the employer's collec-
tive bargaining agreement or policy manual. In order to litigate 
these additional claims in the unemployment forum, the employer 
will feel the need to use legal representation. 261 
259. See Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 449. While the unemployment 
hearing officer can attempt to preclude introduction of evidence unrelated to the 
unemployment issue to avoid lengthy hearings, see Committee on Benefits to 
Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 19, the effort to litigate such issues, and 
the resulting arguments about relevance, will extend the time required for hearing. 
Furthermore, it will not always be easy for the hearing officer to distinguish at 
the hearing between information relevant to the unemployment benefits issue and 
information relevant only to a potential later lawsuit. The result may be either 
that the hearing officer errs on the side of admitting all evidence proffered, 
thereby lengthening the hearing process, or that more unemployment cases are 
reversed by appellate bodies because necessary evidence was excluded from the 
record. If the hearing officer prevents the parties from introducing evidence 
relevant to the later lawsuit, such as evidence of disparate treatment, then 
collateral estoppel should not be applied. See supra note 206 and accompanying 
text. 
260. Potential unlawful motivations would include the employee's race, 
gender, religion, national origin, age, exercise of constitutional rights (for public 
employees), complaints to OSHA, exercise of rights under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, refusal 
to violate the law, exercise of other rights granted by law, and any bad faith 
attempt on the part of the employer to prevent the employee from obtaining the 
benefits of the contract. 
261. Currently, employers use attorneys in only nine percent of unemploy-
ment compensation cases. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Because 
the amount at risk in a discharge case is so much larger than in the unemployment 
hearing, employers anticipating preclusion will not litigate without legal represen-
tation. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text. The employee anticipating 
a later lawsuit also will try to prove that there is a judicial cause of action in 
the unemployment hearing, necessitating legal representation. 
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The effects of shifting discharge litigation to unemployment 
compensation hearings are significant. First, such a shift will reduce 
the benefits of collateral estoppel because it will merely move the 
expenditure of the resources of the parties and the judicial system 
from one forum to another. 262 
Second, the shift may disadvantage employees who are likely 
to be less sophisticated about the possibility of collateral estoppel 
and less likely to use attorneys in the unemployment proceeding, 
because of both a lack of awareness of the risk of preclusion and 
a lack of funds to pay the lawyer. 263 An employee who is aware 
of both the potential discharge claim and the impact of collateral 
estoppel may be able to obtain an attorney for the unemployment 
compensation claim in anticipation of the more lucrative discharge 
litigation.264 For many employees, however, the rapid processing 
of the claim for unemployment compensation benefits will occur 
before full recognition of, or exploration of, the possibility of 
litigation over the discharge. 265 The employee unwittingly may find 
himself or herself unrepresented in a complex and extensive hearing 
262. See Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 449. 
263. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 
1986); Silver, supra note 29, at 415 ("Explaining preclusion to those versed in 
the law is a formidable challenge; how can we expect unrepresented litigants to 
understand it and its consequences?"). 
264. There are three related reasons that claimants are rarely able to obtain 
legal representation for unemployment compensation claims. First, many statutes 
limit the amount of fees that a claimant's counsel can charge for litigating an 
unemployment claim. 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) , 2020 (1988). Most states 
limit fees to amounts approved by the agency. Id.; see, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 421.31 (West 1978) ("Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding 
before the commission or a court may be represented by counsel or other duly 
authorized agent; but no such counsel or agents shall either charge or receive for 
such services more than an amount approved by the commission."). Some states 
set a maximum amount of fees, either as a dollar amount or a percentage of the 
benefits at issue. 1J3 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) , 2020, 4544 (1988). For example, 
Arizona limits the fee to $300 unless the agency approves a higher amount, which 
may be up to $750. Id. The second reason that few claimants can obtain 
representation is that the number of claims and amount of each claim are too 
small to enable attorneys to build a financially stable practice of low cost, high 
volume representation. McHugh, supra note 247, at 866. Finally, because the 
amount at stake is so small, few claimants can afford to pay for representation. 
Id. 
265. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 209. Notably, 
the claims procedure has been designed to allow the employee to pursue a claim 
for unemployment benefits without the need for an attorney. See 1B Unempl. 
Ins. Rep. (CCH) , 2020 (1988). 
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that later precludes any legal challenge to the discharge. 266 Simi-
larly, the employer that decides not to utilize an attorney or not 
to appeal an adverse decision awarding compensation to an em-
ployee because of the limited amount at risk may later find itself 
bound to the decision in a much more costly wrongful termination 
suit.267 
Employees and employers who are aware of the potential for 
preclusion have several options, all of which interfere with the 
policies underlying unemployment compensation legislation. The 
employee may decide to forego the claim for unemployment com-
pensation benefits to avoid risking the discharge claim of poten-
tially much greater value. 268 The employee may be unprepared to 
litigate the discharge claim by the unemployment hearing date269 
due to the inability to gather the necessary evidence and witnesses. 
Also, since discovery is unavailable in the unemployment forum, 
an employee may be disadvantaged in pursuing a discharge claim. 270 
266. Even the aware employee who desires representation may be unable to 
obtain it. See supra note 264. The unrepresented employee facing employer's 
counsel not only risks the discharge claim, but has a reduced chance of success 
in the claim for unemployment benefits. See supra note 138. 
267. While preclusion has been applied more often against the employee, 
there is also a risk that it will be applied against the employer. See cases cited 
supra note 84, where employees sought to collaterally estop employer from 
defending unlawful discharge claims on the basis of unemployment compensation 
decisions; Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 845-47 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Spearman v. Delco Remy Div. of General Motors Corp., 717 
F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ind. 1989). Testimony by the Chamber of Commerce suggests 
that employers support elimination of collateral estoppel based on unemployment 
decisions. See Reforming the Unemployment Compensation System: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 116, 117 [hereinafter 1989 Subcommittee Hearing] 
(statement of Warren Blue, Employee Benefits and Relations Committee, Council 
of State Chambers of Commerce). 
268. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 
1986); Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 209. In an article 
regarding litigation strategy, the authors suggest that attorneys should not advise 
discharged employees to seek unemployment compensation benefits unless they 
are prepared to litigate all issues that might arise in later proceedings in the 
unemployment hearing. Culverhouse & Hollis, Strategic Considerations in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, 94 CASE & CoM. 19 (Nov.-Dec. 1989). 
269. Because of federal requirements for prompt hearings and determina-
tions, the typical unemployment hearing normally will take place three to four 
weeks after the claim for benefits is filed. Postponements and continuances are 
discouraged. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 208, 209-
10. 
270. See Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. 
Utah 1988). 
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Furthermore, in most cases the typical unemployment hearing 
officer, having a massive caseload and specific training only in 
unemployment compensation issues271 will have insufficient exper-
tise or time to determine the complex motivation questions pre-
sented in many discharge cases.272 For all of these reasons, the 
employee may waive the opportunity for unemployment compen-
sation benefits simply to preserve a discharge claim. Thus work.-ers, 
perhaps unlawfully deprived of their livelihood, must make an 
additional financial sacrifice by foregoing the very unemployment 
compensation benefits designed to provide "prompt if only partial 
replacement of wages to the unemployed, to enable workers 'to 
tide themselves over, until they get back to their old work or find 
other employment, without having to resort to relief."'273 
Therefore, the application of collateral estoppel potentially 
interferes with the purposes of the unemployment statute. The 
statute was designed to provide income for the-unemployed worker 
to avoid the necessity of resorting to welfare and to provide security 
271. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 208 ("The 
issues covered in unemployment compensation hearings are generally quite limited. 
Appeals referees, who are usually not attorneys, may hear anywhere from twenty 
to forty appeals each week, and hearings last approximately thirty minutes."); 
New York Bar Committee Report, supra note 136, at 741 (in New York, the 
hearing officer has "less than one hour to acquaint him or herself with the file, 
take all testimony, hear argument, research any cases cited by the parties and 
write the decision"); Lewis v. IBM Corp., 393 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D. Or. 1974) 
("The average hearing lasts forty-five minutes. The referees who conduct the 
hearings are not necessarily lawyers."). 
272. See Silver, supra note 29, at 410, 417. Courts dealing with such questions 
on a regular basis have struggled with such issues, casting doubt on whether the 
decisions of hearing officers who do not do so should be entitled to any deference. 
While Silver discusses civil rights questions, similar issues of motivation may be 
present in statutory or common law cases alleging employment discrimination for 
exercising one's statutory rights or refusing to violate the law. See, e.g., Donovan 
v. Diplomat & Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417 (E.D. N.Y. 1984), afj'd 
without opinion, 160 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985). The problem of lack of expertise 
will be minimized when the court accords preclusive effect only to factual findings. 
For example, a court could defer to an administrative finding that an employee 
engaged in misconduct, but allow the employee nonetheless to litigate the dis-
crimination issue. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. When issue 
preclusion is determined on a case by case basis, however, neither the employee 
nor the employer can be certain how the court will apply the doctrine, if at all. 
Thus, the parties in the unemployment proceeding must decide the litigation 
strategy in light of the risk that the court will accord the findings their complete 
preclusive effect. 
273. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131-
32 (1971) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1935)). 
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so that the worker could search for additional employment. 274 
Additionally, unemployment benefits were intended to aid the 
economy by insuring continued purchasing power during a reces-
sion. 275 If employees are discouraged from applying for benefits 
because of the potential impact on their later discharge litigation, 
the beneficial purposes of unemployment compensation legislation 
will be frustrated. 276 
Additionally, if the employer decides not to challenge an 
employee's application for benefits because of the potential for 
issue preclusion, the policies underlying unemployment compen-
sation legislation could be undermined. Unemployment compen-
sation is designed to provide income to individuals who are 
unemployed through no fault of their own.277 Employers who fail 
to challenge benefits for unqualified employees allow them to 
collect benefits that would otherwise remain in the fund to be paid 
to entitled employees. Since most states have inadequate trust fund 
reserves to pay benefits during times of high unemployment, 278 
benefit payments to unqualified employees adversely impact the 
underlying basis of the unemployment compensation system. 
The remaining alternative for employers and employees faced 
with the possibility of preclusion is to litigate every possible issue 
in the unemployment proceeding. As discussed, the employee who 
is unable to retain counsel may be disadvantaged significantly 
under this alternative. 279 The impact on the unemployment com-
pensation system, however, is even more significant than the impact 
on the individual employee. The system was designed for the 
speedy processing of claims to insure prompt payment of benefits. 
Prompt payment of benefits serves two important goals: avoiding 
274. Id. 'at 131-32. 
275. Id. at 132-33. 
276. These purposes also will be frustrated if employees are improperly 
denied unemployment benefits because of their inability to litigate the issues 
adequately, since they are increasingly facing employers represented by counsel. 
See supra note 138. 
277. Cf. Saucier & Roberts, supra note 4, at 594. 
278. See Rejda & Lee, supra note 136, at 655. States with inadequate funds 
can borrow from the federal government. Id. If the funds are not repaid on 
time, however, employers in the state are subjected to penalty taxes which 
negatively affect the economy of the state, hindering the state's recovery from 
recession. Id. at 655-56. 
279. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text. On the other hand, an 
employee with a weak discharge case and a sympathetic unemployment agency 
may actually be aided by the doctrine of preclusion. See Culverhouse & Hollis, 
supra note 268, at 22-24. The same is true of an employer, however. Id. 
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the need for the employee to resort to welfare and stabilizing 
consumer demand to help mitigate the effects of recession. 280 The 
Social Security Act requires that a state's methods of administra-
tion ''be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unem-
ployment compensation when due. " 281 The Supreme Court has 
held that the words "'when due' were intended to mean at the 
earliest stage of unemployment that such payments were adminis-
tratively feasible, after giving both the worker and the employer 
an opportunity to be heard. " 282 If the conditions are not met the 
Secretary of Labor may refuse to certify the state for payment of 
federal funds under the unemployment insurance program. 283 
To ensure that states meet the important statutory objective of 
the earliest possible payment of benefits to unemployed workers, 
the Secretary of Labor has issued regulations governing claims 
procedures and requiring quality control measures of the state 
agency involved. 284 The Secretary also has issued specific standards 
for timeliness of benefit payments which states must meet to insure 
their continued eligibility for federal funds and tax credits.285 For 
example, initial benefit payments must be issued to eighty-seven 
percent of intrastate claimants within fourteen days of the end of 
the first compensable week286 and to ninety-three percent of such 
280. See Java, 402 U.S. at 133. 
281. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(l) (1988). 
282. Java, 402 U.S. at 131. The length of time required to obtain admin-
istrative review is also relevant in determining whether the system meets the due 
process requirements of the United States Constitution. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U.S. 379, 389, reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975). 
283. The Social Security Act, which established the unemployment compen-
sation program, created a system of federal-state cooperation. Rosbrow, supra 
note 57, at 22. The statute encourages the states to set up unemployment 
compensation systems by giving employers credit for state unemployment com-
pensation system payments against the federal unemployment compensation tax. 
Id. at 22-23. The federal tax is imposed on all employers in interstate commerce 
having eight or more employees. Id. In addition, the cost of administering the 
state program is paid from the federal share of unemployment insurance tax 
revenue paid by employers. Id. at 23. The federal law contains a number of 
standards, including the standard for administration discussed. Id. at 24. Failure 
to comply with these standards can result in either a withholding of federal funds 
for state administrative costs or a denial of credit to employers for state 
unemployment tax contributions, depending on the standard violated. Id. at 24-
25. 
284. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 601.5, 602.10-.40 (1990). 
285. See id. §§ 640.1-.9, 650.1-.5. 
286. In states without the noncompensable waiting week for payment of 
benefits, eighty-seven percent of claims must be paid within twenty-one days. Id. 
§ 640.5. For interstate claims, seventy percent of the initial payments must be 
made within the specified time periods. Id. 
1864 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1803 
claimants within thirty-five days.287 Similar timeliness standards 
govern decisions on appeal. State law must provide for hearing 
and decision on appeal with the greatest promptness administra-
tively feasible.288 In fact, sixty percent of all first level benefit 
appeal decisions must be issued within thirty days of the appeal 
and eighty percent must be issued within forty-five days of the 
appeal.289 
Brief and informal hearings are essential if a state is to meet 
these standards.290 When issues are relatively limited, a hearing 
which contains the essential elements of due process can be con-
ducted in thirty to forty-five minutes,291 enabling hearing officers 
to conduct approximately twenty to forty hearings per week.292 
If, as a result of the potential for preclusion, employers or 
employees insist on litigating all possible causes of action that may 
arise from a discharge and appealing any adverse decision, the 
impact on the unemployment compensation system will be devas-
tating. 293 Even a few insistent parties who litigate discharge cases 
287. Id. § 640.5. For interstate claims, seventy-eight percent must be paid 
within thirty-five days. Id. 
288. See id. §§ 650.3, 650.4. 
289. See id. § 650.4(b). 
290. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 208. 
291. Id. at 208-09. See supra note 271 and infra note 292 for additional 
information about the average length of hearings in various states. The length 
of time required for the review process is also a relevant factor in determining 
whether the unemployment compensation claims procedure provides sufficient 
process to survive a constitutional challenge. See supra note 282. 
292. Unemployment Board's Statement, supra note 104, at 208. In New 
York, during 1984, each hearing officer (administrative law judge) was responsible 
for approximately 1,300 cases, which required about six hearings per judge per 
day. New York Bar Committee Report, supra note 136, at 741. The judges not 
only heard six cases per day, but wrote a decision in each one as well. Id. The 
caseload for referees in Missouri is 21-25 cases per week. Richard, Correction, 5 
J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES, 97, 97 (1985). This includes both hearing the 
case and issuing a written decision. It has been argued that unemployment 
hearings are not unique, but are rather like all other administrative hearings. 
Thus, if collateral estoppel is inappropriate for unemployment hearings, it is 
inappropriate for all administrative hearings. See Committee on Benefits to 
Unemployed Person, supra note 2, at 80-81. The caseload of unemployment 
hearing officers is extremely high, however, necessitating a brief hearing to insure 
that statutory purposes are accomplished. In contrast to the unemployment 
caseload noted above, administrative law judges for the Social Security Admin-
istration, which employs seventy percent of federal administrative law judges, are 
expected to dispose of 37 cases per month. See Himelstein, Federal Administrative 
Judges Seek Reform, 124 N.J. L.J., July 27, 1989, at 208, col. 3. 
293. Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 209. According 
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because of the preclusion potential will cause significant delays in 
the processing of unemployment compensation claims, since a 
hearing on all discharge issues may take several days or several 
weeks.294 Lengthy hearings in even a few cases would severely 
restrict the hearing officer's ability to hear and decide other cases. 
In addition to increasing in length, the hearings would increase 
in complexity, both procedurally and substantively. Few employers 
would proceed without attorneys in a hearing that could decide a 
discharge case with six-figure liability .295 The use of attorneys would 
increase requests for subpoenas,296 transcripts, and continuances.297 
to data from the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and Training Admin., there 
were 18,720,006 spells of unemployment for which claims were filed in 1990. 
The data also revealed that there were 825, 706 decisions by the lower appellate 
authority in the states and 131,006 c;lecisions by the higher appellate authority, 
which exists in only about half of the states. See supra note 67 and accompanying 
text. Thus, there are a number of claims filed where no appeal is taken. An 
increase in appeals would adversely affect the ability of a state agency to meet 
federal standards for timeliness of appellate decisions. See supra notes 288-89 
and accompanying text. . 
294. A study of 120 wrongful discharge cases that went to trial in California 
showed an average trial length of 10.5 days. J. DERTOUZOS, E. HOLLAND & P. 
EBENER, supra note 1, at 25. The minimum trial length was two days and the 
maximum 30 days. Id. Employment discrimination trials are also lengthy, certainly 
far longer than 45 minutes. See A. RuZicHo, L. JACOBS & L. THRASHER, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LmGATION 399-462 (1989), which gives guidance 
for trial preparation, for an idea of the complexity of an employment discrimi-
nation trial. "When employers are forced to defend themselves in an unemploy-
ment hearing with sufficient thoroughness to prevent unjust application of collateral 
estoppel, such proceeding typically needs to be continued over several days 
creating an expense which oftentimes exceed [sic] the amount in controversy at 
the hearing." 1989 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 267, at 185 (letter from 
Louis Fernandez, Jr., Vice-President, Chevron C9rp.). 
295. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
296. While hearing officers and commission members generally have the 
authority to issue subpoenas, 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH), 1 2020 (1986), the 
authority is rarely used. See New York Bar Committee Report, supra note 136, 
at 742. 
297. Because of the federal time standards and the large caseloads of the 
hearing officers, continuances are discouraged. Unemployment Boards' Statement, 
supra note 103 at 208. See also New York Bar Committee Report, supra note 
136, at 742 (without postponements, which are discouraged, "there is little ..• 
opportunity for parties to seek information, prepare witnesses or gather other 
evidence for presentation"). In contrast, a study of 120 wrongful discharge trials 
in California showed that the average time from initial filing to trial was 38 
months, and the minimum time was 10 months. See J. DERTouzos, J. HOLLAND 
& P. EBENER, supra note 1, at 24-25. 
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Furthermore, attorneys would attempt to legalize the proceedings 
by insisting on compliance with the rules of evidence and procedure 
with which they are both familiar and comfortable. 298 In addition, 
as noted above, attorneys would attempt to litigate not only issues 
of disqualification for benefits based on misconduct or voluntary 
termination, but also issues of motive, disparate treatment, good 
faith, existence of any implied contract, and other evidence of 
discrimination.299 Since the employer in most cases will not know 
what discharge claims the employee may bring, the employer's 
attorney may attempt to offer evidence on all issues. The resulting 
delay in unemployment claim p:i;:ocessing will adversely affect all 
claimants, although few may bring a later discharge action. 300 
The unemployment agency faced with increasingly lengthy and 
complex hearings and more appeals has two alternatives. The 
agency can hire more hearing officers, which will increase the 
agency's costs, or it can allow delays in benefit payments, jeop-
ardizing its ability to meet federal standards. The agency may be 
unable to increase the number of hearing officers if funds are not 
available. To obtain additional funds, the tax on employers would 
have to be increased.301 Neither alternative is acceptable for an 
agency already financially strapped. 302 
298. As lawyers have become more involved in the labor arbitration process 
as both arbitrators and advocates, increasing legalization of the process has 
reduced the advantages of labor arbitration as a quick, inexpensive alternative 
to litigation. A. Cox, D. BoK, R. GORMAN & M. FINKIN, LABOR LAW 747 (11th 
ed. 1991). 
299. The increased use of attorneys and the resulting increase in the com-
plexity of the proceedings will disadvantage claimants in many cases, which is 
also contrary to the purpose of the unemployment statutes. See supra notes 263-
66 and accompanying text. 
300. While the hearing officer could attempt to limit litigation of issues not 
relevant to the benefits decision, efforts to litigate such issues would not be 
discouraged where the potential for collateral estoppel existed, and such efforts 
could be time-consuming for the hearing officer. See Committee on Benefits to 
Unemployed Persons, supra note 2, at 79. It might be argued that it is more 
efficient to relegate these issues to the administrative proceeding rather than to 
force litigation into the court system, even at the cost of raising unemployment 
insurance taxes. This efficiency, however, is more than counterbalanced by the 
fact that the parties will litigate many discharge cases in the unemployment forum 
that never would have been filed in the court system because the hearing on the 
unemployment claim will occur long before the employee would have to initiate 
any discharge claim in court. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
301. Administrative costs are paid from the federal share of employers' 
taxes. See Price, supra note 90, at 24. 
302. Current efforts to increase the tax are meeting with strong employer 
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Despite the federal standards for timely processing and the 
serious possible consequences for failing to meet such standards, 
a significant number of states have consistently failed to comply 
with the federal standard for timeliness of appeals decisions. 303 
Any increase in the length of hearings will multiply the problem 
of timely claim processing and delay benefits for all claimants-a 
result that is directly contrary to the goal of providing money to 
the unemployed as quickly as possible. 
Recent studies of the unemployment system have found that 
fewer unemployed persons received benefits in the 1980s than in 
previous years.304 In 1987, the percentage of the unemployed re-
ceiving benefits fell to 31.5 percent, a new record low. 305 Benefits 
per unemployed person also have decreased. 306 Moreover, the un-
resistance. See Zuckman, Recession May Be Good News for Unemployment Bill, 
49 CONG. Q. 422 (1991); UI Reform Splits Business and Labor, 136 Lab. Rel. 
Rep. (BNA) 380, 381 (Apr. 1, 1991). Moreover, in order to accomplish the 
purposes of the system, increased taxes should provide increased benefits, if 
possible. Furthermore, increasing staff is not an option in many states where the 
agencies already have been forced to reduce staff and close offices due to financial 
problems. See 1989 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 267, at 16 (statement of 
Les AuCoin); Id. at 33 (statement of former Gov. James Blanchard, Michigan); 
Id. at 53 (statement of the Hon. Neil Goldschmidt, Gov. of Oregon); Unem-
ployment Insurance and the Recession: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human 
Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 54-
55, 59 (1991) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing (216191)] (statement of Michael 
V. Deisz, President, Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies). 
303. According to data from the U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and 
Training Admin., from Aug. 1, 1990 to July 31, 1991, 20 jurisdictions failed to 
dispose of sixty percent of appeals within 30 days, as required by federal 
standards, and 16 jurisdictions failed to dispose of eighty percent of appeals 
within 45 days, as required. This data also reveals that, regarding appeals in all 
jurisdictions for the same time period, only 57 .50J'o of lower authority appeals 
were decided within 30 days, and only 76.9% were decided within 45 days (data 
on file at The Wayne Law Review). Thus the federal timeliness standards simply 
are not being met. In 1984, 17 states, along with the District of Columbia, the 
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, failed to meet the federal standards for timeliness 
of appeals. See Sanbome & Breslau, State Unemployment Insurance Appeals 
Data, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 147, 149 (1985). 
304. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, An Examination of Declining U/ Claims 
During the 1980s ix (1988); Shapiro, supra note 229, at 1; Rejda & Lee, supra 
note 136, at 652. 
305. Shapiro, supra note 229, at 1. Since 1989, the proportion of unemployed 
persons receiving benefits has risen slightly, with an average of thirty-seven 
percent collecting benefits in 1990. Subcommittee Hearing (216191), supra note 
302, at 9 (statement of Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unemployment Insurance 
Serv., Employment and Training Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor). 
306. Shapiro, supra note 229, at 3. 
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employed receive little from other government assistance pro-
grams. 307 Finally, unemployed persons remained unemployed longer 
in the 1980s.308 As a result of these increases in unemployment 
and decreases in benefits, the unemployment compensation pro-
gram is failing, in many respects, to achieve the goals of reducing 
poverty, stabilizing the economy, and returning employees to the 
work force as quickly as possible. 309 
A major reason for the recent decline in the number of 
unemployed receiving benefits is the presence of more restrictive 
state eligibility requirements and administrative practices. 310 Benefit 
denials for misconduct have increased, 311 and while benefit denials 
for voluntary terminations have declined, authors of a recent study 
suggest that this reduction reflects more stringent administrative 
practices which discourage claimants who quit from applying for 
benefits at all.312 Analysts of the unemployment compensation 
307. Id. at 7. Government funds for employment and training programs also 
have decreased. Id. at 9. 
308. Id. at 11. This trend has continued in the 1990s. See Long-Term 
Unemployed: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1991) [hereinafter 
Subcommittee Hearing (2126191)) (testimony of Isaac Shapiro, Senior Research 
Analyst, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities); Shapiro & Nichols, supra note 
229, at 6. In July 1991, a record number of unemployed workers exhausted their 
unemployment insurance benefits, a larger number than at any time since collec-
tion of such data began in 1951. See Exhaustion of UI Benefits Said to Hit 
Record Level, 138 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 58 (Sept. 9, 1991). The problem of 
long-term unemployment is clearly increasing. 
309. Shapiro, supra note 229, at 10; Rejda & Lee, supra note 136, at 655; 
Shapiro & Nichols, supra note 224, at 25-28. See supra notes 274-76, 280-83 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the goals of the unemployment compen-
sation system. 
310. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 304, at xi-xii. Many states tightened 
eligibility requirements because of insolvent trust fund accounts. Rejda & Lee, 
supra note 136, at 652. See also Subcommittee Hearing (216191), supra note 302, 
at 88-96 (testimony of Gary Burtless, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution). A 
recent empirical analysis confirms that state legislative restrictions significantly 
contributed to the decline in unemployment benefit recipients in the 1980s. 
Baldwin & McHugh, Unprepared for Recession: The Erosion of State Unem-
ployment Insurance Coverage Fostered by Public Policy in the 1980s 18-19 
(Economic Policy Institute 1992). The authors recommended federal standards to 
limit states' ability to undermine the goals of the unemployment compensation 
system. Id. at 1-2, 19. 
311. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 304, at xi. 
312. See Id. at xi, 65. Because many states changed voluntary leaving 
disqualifications from a specific period to the duration of unemployment, claim-
ants who quit no longer applied for benefits, reducing the number of claims and 
consequently the number of denials. Id. at 65. 
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system have not identified collateral estoppel as a factor in the 
recent reduction of the number of unemployed persons receiving 
benefits. It seems clear, however, that for a number of reasons, 
unemployment compensation is failing to meet the goals that 
motivated passage of the statute. Collateral estoppel, because it 
discourages claimants with potential discharge actions from filing 
claims and increases the delay in claim processing, compounds the 
inability of unemployment compensation to provide the quick 
cushion for unemployed workers that will stabilize the economy 
and avoid resort to welfare. When the length of unemployment 
periods increases, the effects of delay will be even more devastating 
for the unemployed worker. 
In the current recessionary economy, it is prudent to avoid 
any policy that prevents unemployment compensation from accom-
plishing its goals.313 Barring preclusion based on unemployment 
compensation decisions will avoid creating additional problems for 
a system already in crisis.314 Moreover, the suggested preclusion 
bar will not interfere significantly with the policies underlying 
collateral estoppel. The application of preclusion based on unem-
ployment compensation decisions is inconsistent with the principles 
of collateral estoppel in many cases. And even when collateral 
estoppel is properly applied, it rarely serves the goal of judicial 
economy because it merely shifts litigation from one forum to 
another and requires additional judicial resources to evaluate and 
determine the preclusion question. 
IV. THE SOLUTION: A FEDERAL LAW PRECLUDING PRECLUSION 
Twenty-three states have enacted statutory limits on according 
preclusive effect to unemployment compensation decisions.315 If 
313. Even if the current economy were robust, however, a policy denying 
preclusion would be consistent with the goals of the unemployment statute. The 
current economic problems simply highlight the need for this change. See Sub-
committee Hearing (216191), supra note 302, at 4, 5, 18-19. 
314. See supra notes 303-10 and accompanying text; Shapiro & Nichols, 
supra note 229, at 21-28 (unemployment compensation system is ill-equipped for 
the current recession and the problems will become more acute if the recession 
does not end by mid-1991 as predicted at the time of publication); Subcommittee 
Hearing (216191), supra note 302, at 56-61. 
315. States with statutory limitations as of 1989 are Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New York, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Unemployment 
Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 210. Ohio enacted a statutory prohibition 
on collateral estoppel in 1989. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(5) (Baldwin 
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the issue is left to state discretion, however, preclusion will remain 
a possibility in many states, leading to the problems identified 
earlier. It has been argued that each state should determine for 
itself whether collateral estoppel is having an adverse impact on 
its unemployment system, and, if so, the state could take legislative 
action, as some states have. 316 This argument, however, ignores 
the history and structure of the unemployment compensation laws. 
The current unemployment compensation system is of federal 
origin, motivated by a desire to provide income maintenance to 
prevent the need for resort to other welfare systems, to maintain 
purchasing power, and to stabilize the economy. 317 Pursuant to the 
federal law, the states set up unemployment compensation systems, 
Supp. 1991). In 1990, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Vermont added 
statutory restrictions on the use of unemployment compensation determinations 
to collaterally estop later litigation. Runner, supra note 3, at 63, 65, 66; ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1194.12 (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-55 
(1991 Repl. Part); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2-610A (West Supp. 1992); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1353 (Supp. 1991). Texas enacted a statute barring collateral 
estoppel based on unemployment decisions in 1991. See Runner, supra note 3, 
at 66, 68; GA. ConE .ANN. § 34-8-122(b) (Supp. 1991). In addition, the Michigan 
Supreme Court has construed the unemployment compensation statute to deny 
application of collateral estoppel. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
The Indiana Supreme Court in McC/anahan, 517 N.E.2d at 395, refused to 
accord collateral estoppel effect to an unemployment proceeding because of the 
informal nature of the hearing. The court indicated that collateral estoppel might 
be appropriate based on other administrative proceedings, suggesting that its 
holding precluded any application of collateral estoppel based on unemployment 
compensation determinations. Id. In Spearman v. Delco Remy Div. of General 
Motors Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (S.D. Ind. 1989), however, the court 
interpreted McC/anahan to permit application of collateral estoppel based on a 
decision by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, a more formal 
and judicial proceeding according to the court. For further discussion of the 
decision in McClanahan, see Pitts & Stuart, Mcclanahan v. Remington Freight 
Lines, Inc.: Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill, 22 IND. L. REv. 1 (1989). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in White v. Ardan, (1988) 430 N.W.2d 27, 34, 
230 Neb. 11, 22, rejected the argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
applied based on an unemployment compensation proceeding, noting that the 
statute stated only that conclusions were determinative for purposes of the 
unemployment law, not for other causes of action. See supra note l18. The 
court's language suggests that the Nebraska statute will not be interpreted to 
permit collateral estoppel based on unemployment compensation determinations. 
316. The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA) 
supports state rather than federal legislation. See Statement by Michael V. Deisz, 
President, ICESA, to Subcommittee on Human Resources House Committee on 
Ways and Means (March 21, 1991) at 2-3. (on file with author); 1989 Subcom-
mittee Hearing, supra note 267, at 106 (statement of Joseph Weisenberg, ICESA). 
317. See Price, supra note 90, at 24. 
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but federal law has always provided standards with which the 
states must comply to receive federal benefits, standards designed 
to insure that the goals of the program are met. 318 
Among the significant requisites of the federal law are the 
requirements for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal and 
timely processing of claims. 319 In order to insure that these stan-
dards are not unduly at risk, it is appropriate for the federal 
government to preclude the states from applying collateral estoppel 
based on unemployment decisions. 320 The states can avoid delays 
caused by the potential application of preclusion only by adding 
hearing officers, which will increase administrative costs. Because 
state administrative costs are paid by federal grant, this alternative 
also implicates the federal interest. Thus, congressional legislation 
barring estoppel is consistent with the federal government's role 
of providing minimum standards for unemployment compensation 
and will help insure that the states' ability to process claims fairly 
and efficiently is not impaired.321 
Congressional legislation that would require the states to deny 
preclusion has been introduced in several sessions of Congress, but 
has yet to be enacted.322 A similar prohibition on collateral estoppel 
is currently before the Congress. 323 The current bill would amend 
318. See supra notes 280-89 and accompanying text. 
319. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), (3) (1988); 20 C.F.R. §§ 640, 650; Java, 402 
U.S. at 130-35; Fusari, 419 U.S. at 383-84, 387-89. 
320. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 210. In 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Mary Ann Wyrsch, 
Director of the Unemployment Ins. Serv., Employment and Training Admin., 
U.S. Dep't of Labor, acknowledged that application of collateral estoppel could 
create conflicts with federal timeliness and fair hearing requirements. See 1989 
Subcommlttee Hearing, supra note 267, at 72. The Department of Labor rec-
ommends state rather than federal legislation, however. Id. 
321. See Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 210. 
322. H.R. 5572, which would have amended the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act to require states to deny preclusive effect to unemployment compensation 
decisions, was introduced in the 100th Congress, but was not adopted. See 
Unemployment Boards' Statement, supra note 104, at 210. H.R. 2369, which 
contained the same requirement, was introduced in the 101st Congress by Rep. 
Morrison. See 1989 Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 267, at 27 (testimony of 
Rep. Bruce A. Morrison). A companion bill, S. 3086, was introduced in the 
Senate by Senator Lieberman. S. 3086, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. 
13511 (1990). Eventually the House bill became a part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, but the conference agreement on the bill did not 
include the ban on collateral estoppel. 136 CONG. REc. H12676 (Oct. 26, 1990). 
323. See H.R. 1367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (1991); H.R. 3040, 102nd Cong., 
1st Sess. (1991). The collateral estoppel provisions are a part of comprehensive 
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Section 3304(a) of the Internal Revenue Code to provide as follows: 
[N]o finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final 
order made with respect to a claim for unemployment 
compensation benefits pursuant to the State's unemploy-
ment compensation law may be conclusive or binding or 
used as evidence in any separate or subsequent action or 
proceeding in another forum, except proceedings under the 
State's unemployment compensation law, regardless of 
whether the prior action was between the same or related 
parties or involved the same facts . . . . 324 
The bill, as proposed, would make denial of collateral estoppel a 
requirement for the state's eligibility for federal assistance under 
the Social Security Act.325 For reasons noted above, enactment of 
legislation, proposed to amend the unemployment compensation program in 
several respects. The Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Ways and 
Means Committee held hearings on House Bill 1367, a bill entitled the Unem-
ployment Insurance Reform Act of 1991, on Feb. 6, 20, and 26, and March 21 
and 22, 1991; the bill was approved by the subcommittee on June 26, 1991. 
Subsequently, the collateral estoppel provisions proposed in H.R. 1367 were 
incorporated in H.B. 3040, which was reported out of the Committee on Ways 
and Means for consideration by the full House. (information from the House 
Subcommittee on Human Resources) See infra note 324. 
324. H.R. 1367 (1991); 1991 H.R. 3040, § 204, (1991). H.R. 3040, which 
contains identical provisions on collateral estoppel to H.R. 1367, was passed by 
the House on September 17, 1991. 137 CoNG. REc. H6628. (1991). On June 16, 
1992 the Senate Finance Committee ordered H.R. 3040 favorably reported with 
amendments striking all of the provisions on unemployment compensation, in-
cluding collateral estoppel. 138 CONG. REc. 0729. On June 19, 1992, the Bill 
was reported in the Senate. 138 CONG. REc. S 8659 (June 23, 1992). 
The Senate passed S. 1722, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 1991, on Sept. 24, 1991. 137 CONG. REc. S13475 (1991). The House and 
Senate agreed to a conference bill on unemployment compensation which, con-
sistent with S. 1722, did not contain the provisions on collateral estoppel. The 
House agreed to the conference report on the bill on Oct. 1, 1991. 137 CONG. 
REc. H7137 (1991). The Senate agreed to the conference report on the bill the 
same date. 137 CONG. REc. S13999 (1991). President Bush vetoed the bill on 
Oct. 11, 1991. 137 CoNG. REc. S14619 (1991). The Senate failed to override the 
veto. 137 CONG. REc. S14736 (1991). Subsequently Congress enacted several bills 
extending emergency unemployment compensation, but none contained provisions 
relating to collateral estoppel. See supra note 229. 
325. By amending the Internal Revenue Code, the bill would make legislation 
barring preclusion a condition for obtaining federal tax credit for payments to 
state unemployment insurance funds. See Rosbrow, supra note 57, at 24-25; 
l.R.C. § 3304(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
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this legislation is consistent with the purposes of the unemployment 
compensation system and necessary to insure that the unemploy-
ment compensation statutes accomplish the purposes for which 
they were enacted. 
Enactment of the proposed legislation would require states to 
amend their statutes to include a prohibition on use of unemploy-
ment compensation determinations, and findings of fact and law 
incorporated therein, to preclude later litigation in another fo-
rum. 326 A state's failure to include such a statutory provision would 
prevent approval of the state's law by the Secretary of Labor.327 
In the absence of such approval, employers in the state would be 
ineligible for federal tax credit for payments to the state's unem-
ployment insurance fund. 328 
The mandated statutory provisions would require state and 
federal courts hearing state claims to deny preclusion, but federal 
courts considering federal claims would not be directly bound by 
the state law. Because of both the Full Faith and Credit statute329 
and previous United States Supreme Court decisions on the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel, however, the proposed legislation 
should result in elimination of preclusion based on unemployment 
compensation decisions. 
The Full Faith and Credit statute would require a federal court 
to follow the state statute and deny preclusive effect based on a 
state court judgment on an unemployment compensation claim. 330 
Where the state administrative decision was not judicially reviewed, 
however, the Full Faith and Credit statute would not apply. 331 
Nevertheless, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 
Kremer332 and Astoria333 would compel the courts to deny preclusive 
effect based on unreviewed administrative decisions in Title VII 
and ADEA claims respectively. With respect to other federal 
claims, the Supreme Court stated in University of Tennessee v. 
326. See H.R. 3040 § 204, 102d CONG., 1st Sess., 1992 LEXIS H.R. 3040 
(Sept. 19, 1991). 
327. See I.R.C. § 3304(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
328. See supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
329. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) which requires the federal courts to afford 
the same full faith and credit to state court judgments that would apply in the 
state courts. 
330. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text. 
331. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795 (1986). 
332. 456 U.S. 461, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133 (1982). See supra notes 30-
33 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kremer. 
333. 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). See supra notes 38-41 for a discussion of 
Astoria. 
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E/liott334 that " ... federal courts must give the agency's factfinding 
the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the 
State's courts."335 Thus, the federal courts shoq.ld follow the state 
unemployment compensation statutes and deny preclusion. 336 
The proposed bill not only prohibits application of collateral 
estoppel, but also precludes evidentiary use of unemployment 
compensation determinations in later litigation. 
Several critics of the application of collateral estoppel based 
on administrative decisions have suggested that allowing such 
decisions to be used as evidence accomplishes some of the purposes 
of collateral estoppel without the disadvantages. 337 
While such proposals may provide an appropriate alternative 
to preclusion in many situations, the concern for the impact on 
the unemployment compensation system justifies the inclusion of 
a ban on evidentiary use. There may be little, if any, judicial time 
savings for a court that must review an unemployment compen-
sation determination and decide whether to admit it as evidence 
and, if admitted, the weight to accord to the decision. 338 In 
addition, even the potential for evidentiary use may encourage the 
parties anticipating a civil suit to engage in more complex and 
lengthy litigation in the unemployment forum, increasing the use 
of counsel and the number of appeals as well. The potential for 
burdening the unemployment compensation system outweighs the 
potential beneficial effect of permitting evidentiary use of unem-
ployment compensation determinations in later litigation. 339 
334. 478 U.S. 788. 
335. Id. at 799. The Elliott Court thus directed the lower court to accord 
preclusive effect to an unreviewed state administrative agency decision in plain-
tifrs claim based on the Reconstruction civil rights statutes so long as the Utah 
Construction standards for preclusion were met. Id. See supra notes 34-37 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Elliott. 
336. Federal application of state statutory bans on preclusion based unem-
ployment compensation decisions also would be consistent with the exceptions to 
preclusion set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. According to the 
Restatement, courts should deny preclusion where legislative policy indicates that 
the decision of the first tribunal should not be given preclusive effect in subsequent 
proceedings. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 83(4) (1982). Enactment 
of the proposed legislation would establish as both state and federal legislative 
policy that unemployment compensation decisions should not be given preclusive 
effect in subsequent proceedings. 
337. See Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 460-62 and sources cited at 460 
n.180; Silver, supra note 29, at 433-42. 
338. See Perschbacher, supra note 11, at 462. 
339. Current state statutes prohibiting collateral estoppel vary. Some prohibit 
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CONCLUSION 
The effectiveness of the unemployment compensation system 
is threatened by the increasing potential for preclusion in litigation 
challenging discharge based on unemployment compensation de-
terminations. While the current system is not perfect, it provides 
for rapid claims processing and timely awards of benefits to 
unemployed workers in severe financial need. At the same time, 
the system provides due process for claimants seeking benefits and 
for employers challenging eligibility. Applying collateral estoppel 
will encourage introduction of rules of evidence and procedure in 
the system, causing delays in processing tliat will adversely affect 
all claimants. In addition, it may discourage claimants with viable 
discharge claims from seeking benefits because of concern for 
application of collateral estoppel. These risks are not outweighed 
by the benefits of collateral estoppel, for proper application of 
the doctrine will limit significantly the number of cases when 
preclusion is appropriate. In addition, the judicial time savings 
will be offset by lengthier litigation in the unemployment forum. 
Accordingly, to preserve the benefits of the existing unemploy-
ment system, Congress should enact the pending legislation that 
would require states to prohibit the use of collateral estoppel in 
order to be eligible for federal assistance in the unemployment 
compensation program. This federal legislation is the most appro-
priate method for insuring effective functioning of the unemploy-
ment compensation system. 
both preclusive and evidentiary use of unemployment compensation determina-
tions, while others bar only preclusive use. Compare WYo. STAT. § 27-3-406 
(1990 Com. Supp.) with COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-74-108 (1986 Repl. Vol.). This 
disparity further supports enactment of federal legislation. 
